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Delivering energy more intelligently will 
be fundamental to decarbonising the UK 
electricity system at least possible cost, while 
maintaining security and reliability of supply. 
‘Smart grid’ is a catch-all term for the smart 
options that could transform the ways society 
produces, delivers and consumes energy and, 
potentially, the way we conceive of these 
services. Smarter energy delivery is expected 
to be required to allow the integration of the 
expected growth in low carbon technologies 
and to be much more cost effective than 
traditional methods as well as contributing to 
economic growth by opening up new business 
and innovation opportunities. Innovating new 
options for energy system management could 
lead to cost savings of up to £10bn even if 
low carbon technologies do not emerge1. This 
saving will be much higher if UK renewable 
energy targets are achieved.
Building on extensive expert feedback and 
input, this report describes four smart grid 
scenarios which consider how the UK’s 
electricity system might develop to 2050. 
The scenarios outline how decisions made 
in policy, regulation, technology, finance, 
consumer and social behaviour, market design 
or response might affect the decisions of other 
actors and limit or allow the availability of 
future options. The project aims to explore 
the degree of uncertainty around the 
current direction of the electricity system 
and the complex interactions of a whole 
host of factors that may lead to any one of 
a wide range of outcomes. Our addition to 
this discussion will help decision makers 
to understand the implications of possible 
actions across other aspects and plan for the 
future, whilst recognising that it may take any 
one of a number of forms.
Essential Smart Grid Functions
Given the wide range of possible smart 
grid functions that can be enabled via 
various social, technical and organisational 
innovations the project identified essential 
functions that any future UK smart grid 
must possess. Detailed online surveys with 
over 100 experts emphasised the ability 
to balance a large share of intermittent 
renewable generation as the single most 
important function. Other key functions are 
closely related. For example, increasing the 
observability and controllability of networks is 
directly related to the deployment of demand 
side response technologies which will enable 
active management. Active management of 
networks will facilitate the incorporation of a 
range of new technologies that can contribute 
further to decarbonisation – for example, 
active loads such as EVs and heat pumps.
Scenarios
Each of the four scenarios presented here, 
developed through a lengthy process of 
mixed-method engagement with stakeholders, 
ranging from experts to members of the 
public, describes the future development of a 
smart grid. The way in which such a grid may 
evolve will be highly dependent on a range 
of interactions between policy, industry, the 
wider public and others. We present a brief 
summary of each scenario here, along with 
key drivers and barriers and implications for 
policy:
In the Minimum Smart scenario a lack of 
coordination and long-term vision coincides 
with weak consumer acceptance of smart 
technologies and demand side measures. 
There is, in effect, a lack of strong drivers for 
Executive Summary
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any meaningful smart development. Weaker 
drivers do exist, however, and so there is not 
a total absence of smartness, although the 
preponderance of gas generation means there 
is less of a need for demand side flexibility.
In contrast the Groundswell scenario sees very 
strong consumer interest in and engagement 
with the energy system, resulting at least 
partially from increased national concern over 
the declining capacity margin and the upward 
trend in energy prices. This eventually causes 
a radical paradigm shift, with rapid growth in 
community and local authority-run electricity 
generation and even some local network 
management. 
The Smart Power Sector scenario, on the 
other hand, is defined by consumers highly 
resistant to changes in the way they use and 
conceptualise energy. The application of smart 
technologies can therefore only really take 
place ‘behind the scenes’, and this means 
there are limits to what can be achieved. 
Policy and regulatory guidance is firm, 
however, and distribution network operators 
(DNOs) are incentivised to do what they 
need to do when, later in the scenario, high 
numbers of EVs appear and there is significant 
generation from renewables.
Smart 2050 sets the upper boundary for our 
scenarios. Well-coordinated and coherent 
policy action builds strong consumer 
engagement, resulting in a greater number 
of smart grid-support services. Engagement 
differs here from the Groundswell scenario in 
that it is driven by policy. Strong coordination 
and the availability of cost-effective options 
lead to the emergence of a different set of 
technologies and change the nature of the 
smart grid correspondingly.
Key messages
Indicators to measure progress. This 
report demonstrates that diverse outcomes 
are credible, each with very different 
consequences for the achievement of 
government policy goals Examining the 
impacts of our ‘wildcards’ reveals that there 
could be critical ‘branching points’ that may 
result in switching between future pathways. 
Ensuring equitable outcomes. Smarter 
energy delivery promises to enable more 
efficient use of energy infrastructure through 
the introduction of differentiated tariffs and 
demand side response programmes. However, 
our research indicates that the distribution 
of benefits is unlikely to be uniform within 
and across different geographical settings.  
Due to differences in lifestyles, socio-
economic characteristics, education levels 
and normative constraints, consumers’ ability 
and willingness to accept smart technology 
and services may well vary, even down to a 
local level. How costs and benefits may best 
be distributed to prevent the widening of 
these differences is an area in which further 
research is required.
Public engagement. The public does appear 
to understand the lifestyle benefits afforded 
by various smart technologies, although there 
is a widespread perception that the risks and/
or costs of smart grid implementation will 
be borne by consumers, whilst the financial 
benefits will flow to system actors, particularly 
power companies. This perception of the 
uneven distribution of costs and benefits 
is compounded by the widely-felt distrust 
towards the industry, both of which must be 
overcome if they are not to act as a hindrance 
to smart grid development.
Joined-up thinking across smart systems. 
Both our research and the literature indicate 
that in order for consumers to share their 
data there need to be clear and demonstrable 
benefits. Whilst lower bills may motivate 
some, others may need to experience benefits 
beyond financial savings. One way to build 
consumer buy-in could be via offering 
4integrated services within the energy, 
transport or healthcare domains. Such an 
approach may require the establishment 
of new working relationships and business 
models across the energy industry and within 
and between other sectors, such as the 
information and communications technology 
(ICT) industry.  Expert interviews revealed 
that the current advisory body, the Smart 
Grid Forum, is a good starting point, but that 
more needs to be done; for example, the 
development of a regulatory architecture that 
removes and addresses systemic barriers, and 
the addition of consumer representation in 
the Forum itself. Further research could be 
carried out to further the understanding of 
how smart grids can form the foundations 
of wider smart systems, such as smart 
communities and cities.
Risk, Innovation and Investment. Network 
operators traditionally aim to provide a high-
quality service at minimal cost, and there is 
therefore little scope for innovation. However, 
the challenges posed by smart grids will 
necessitate more risk-taking, which will in 
turn generate learning effects and keep down 
the costs of finance in future. There must 
therefore be sufficient incentivisation of such 
behaviour, supported by cultural changes that 
encourage innovation at both the network 
operators and the regulator.
No-regrets technology solutions. The 
possibility of widely differing future outcomes 
raises the question of whether there could 
be some no-regrets technology solutions that 
might help mitigate uncertainty. For example, 
the Smart Power Sector scenario shows that 
balancing the grid would be more difficult 
when demand side response (DSR) options 
are not widespread. Bearing in mind the long 
lead times of infrastructure investments in 
the power sector, technologies like distributed 
storage or EV smart charging could be used as 
a part of a mitigation strategy. Further work 
needs to be undertaken in this area to identify 
such technology solutions and develop ways 
to support their commercialisation.
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This chapter introduces the concept of ‘smart 
grids’, discussing what they are and how they 
can help the UK to meet its strategic energy 
goals. We outline the purpose of this report 
and locate it within the existing literature 
on energy scenarios, before giving a brief 
overview of the salient issues that together 
form the academic and policy backdrop for 
the project. Finally, we discuss the research 
methods used to develop the scenarios.
1.1 What are smart grids and 
what do they offer?
The UK electricity system is expected to 
include growing volumes of intermittent 
generation such as wind and solar generation. 
More generation is expected to occur in homes 
and businesses and new technologies such 
as heat pumps and electric vehicles (EVs) 
may also lead to much higher demand. The 
way in which networks have operated in the 
past is unlikely to manage the new stresses 
these changes will bring in an effective way, 
and trying to do so is likely to lead to much 
higher system costs and possibly reductions 
in the reliability of electrical supply. Smarter 
energy delivery – often called ‘smart grids’ as a 
catch-all term - may include advances such as 
smarter meters, new kinds of power company, 
time-of-use tariffs and new technologies for 
use on the networks. These advances will 
allow low carbon technologies to be used 
more effectively, reducing network costs and 
protecting quality of supply.
Taken together smarter grids are a key 
enabling technology in efforts to decarbonise 
the UK’s electricity system at least possible 
cost and while maintaining security of supply. 
Smart grids can vary widely in nature but are 
generally understood to include the many 
technological and non-technological options 
that may change the way society generates, 
delivers and consumes energy.
There is currently no widely accepted 
definition of the term ‘smart grid’, with 
definitions varying across working groups and 
countries [1] . Some  commentators consider 
smart grids in terms of technology alone, 
some as being purely about innovation on 
the demand side, while others take a broader 
view of the potential for smartness in the 
wider system. All these definitions refer to 
different functions and capabilities that may 
be supported by smart grids. This variation 
reflects the fact that smart grids, as an 
application, hold together different parts of 
the system: supply mix; the technology and 
infrastructure characteristics of the system; 
data availability, access and type; regulatory 
and market frameworks; policy incentives 
and their effectiveness; consumer capability 
and willingness to engage. As a result of the 
interactions between of these factors, various 
functions might be enabled or disabled in 
different markets. A broad and commonly-
used definition comes from the Smart Grids 
European Technology Platform [2], where 
smart grids are defined as ’electricity networks 
that can intelligently integrate the behaviour 
and actions of all users connected to it – 
generators, consumers and those that do both 
– in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, 
economic and secure electricity supplies.’
Given the lengthy lead times for investment 
in energy infrastructure, the multi-
decadal lifespan of network assets, and the 
combined consequences of technological 
lock-in, learning effects and economies of 
scale, decisions taken today are likely to 
impact strongly on the options available to 
policymakers far into the future.
1.2 Purpose of this report
Using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and drawing on a range 
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of disciplines and stakeholder engagement, 
this project aimed to:
• Identify key steps likely to determine 
the future shape of smart grids at the 
upstream level, together with socio-
economic, behavioural, technological and 
environmental factors influencing the 
uptake of technologies at the end user 
level, and
• Develop a range of smart grid scenarios, 
and subsequently evaluate and refine 
these through expert and public 
workshops, with particular attention paid 
to: through expert and public workshops, 
with particular attention paid to:
 Ō critical branching points within each 
scenario, and
 Ō spatial differences within the UK 
energy system.
Scenarios provide a strong tool for organising 
economic, technological, competitive, political, 
and societal information into a framework 
for decision-making [3]. The interdisciplinary 
nature of smart grids and the interplay of the 
multiple complex factors that will shape their 
emergence, make a scenario approach well-
suited for analysing and informing smart grid 
development.
Previous scenarios have highlighted social, 
economic, policy, and technological drivers of 
change within the energy sector (see section 
1.3). However, little work has been done to 
examine the roles and priorities of different 
actors [4], spatial variation (e.g. urban vs. 
rural, existing energy infrastructure) or 
behavioural issues. This project incorporates 
these essential dimensions into scenarios that 
focus specifically on smart grids. We include 
stakeholders’ assessments of the uncertainties 
and key dimensions associated with smart 
grid development.
1.3 Background 
We conducted a detailed review of the 
interdisciplinary smart grid literature; further 
details can be found in our Literature Review 
report [5]. There are a number of stakeholder 
(DECC Carbon Plan [6], National Grid [7], CCC 
2008 [8], Smart Grid Forum Scenarios [9]) and 
academic (Transition Pathways [10], Tyndall 
[11], Supergen [12], UKERC Energy 2050 [13]) 
scenarios addressing the transition to a low 
carbon energy system in the UK. However, 
the development of smart grids goes beyond 
the wider energy system, encompassing, for 
example, policy, regulatory and commercial 
frameworks, market conditions, and data 
access and security concerns. The majority 
of existing scenarios have been developed 
using optimisation models in order to 
construct a pathway to a given future goal (i.e. 
backcasting). Little attention has been paid to 
behavioural issues other than forcing some 
constraints in the models.
Our scenarios adopt a system perspective by 
considering political, regulatory, commercial, 
financial, behavioural, organisational 
and technical interdependencies. We pay 
particular attention to key branching points 
[10]   (where particular events may force or 
enable switching from one possible smart 
grid pathway to another, such as public 
resistance or political change) rather than 
mere end points from the present day to 2050. 
A distinctive feature of our scenarios is their 
‘socio-technical’ nature, i.e. their focus on 
how social and technical systems interact 
[14]. They explore the future by examining 
how certain events can influence the range 
of options available. They do not attempt to 
quantify the levels of technology penetration 
in each scenario. The upper and lower limits 
for each technology are broadly aligned with 
the most recent public data available from 
the Smart Grid Forum scenarios [9], generated 
as part of the Work Stream 3 activities (for a 
more detailed discussion see Section 5.2).
These scenarios are neither forecasts nor 
predictions, and are not meant to imply any 
probabilities regarding the various futures 
presented. Rather, they are intended to 
represent plausible and internally-consistent 
views of the energy system in order to 
illuminate the many interactions that will 
shape its development, and so contribute 
towards mitigating uncertainty about the 
future. Whilst we identify branching points 
from one scenario to another, our analysis 
reveals that certain actions might limit 
available options in the future.
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By signposting key decisions and their 
implications across the wider socio-
technical system, we hope our scenarios 
will help decision-makers (whether in policy, 
industry or business) avoid any unintended 
consequences, given the significant costs and 
benefits of smart grid technologies and the 
challenges ahead.
1.4  Research methods
The project followed a ‘mixed-method’ 
approach, building on existing literature, 
but generating new data through extensive 
stakeholder engagement. The project was 
carried out in two work packages: 1) data 
collection and 2) scenario development. Both 
work packages involved extensive stakeholder 
engagement (Table 1), via an expert Project 
Advisory Group, expert interviews, online 
Policy Delphi surveys (Box 1),  an expert 
workshop and public workshops. Stakeholders 
included experts in the field of smart grids 
(and related areas, e.g. consumer behaviour), 
communities with relevant experience (e.g. 
electric vehicles, microgeneration), as well as 
members of the general public.
The Policy Delphi surveys focused on 
identifying critical technical, social and policy 
aspects of smart grids. We developed an 
online survey tool for anonymised collection 
of opinions of relevant academic, industry, 
policy and the third sector smart grid experts. 
The first survey round asked about expected 
benefits and pitfalls, functions, and barriers, 
and involved 77 experts (46 male, 31 female). 
Around half were academics and network 
operators, with the remainder spanning 
policymakers, communities with smart grid 
experience, suppliers/generators, interest 
groups, consultants and others. The second 
round expanded on the expected functions 
of smart grids identified in the first round. 
The same group of experts was invited to 
participate; this time 44 (30 male, 14 female) 
completed the survey.
Finally, public workshops were convened 
to explore attitudes to smart grids and 
acceptability of our draft scenarios. Four 
workshops were convened in a range of 
locations with diverse samples (see Table 
1). In sub-groups of 5-7 people, participants 
were first asked about their energy use, what 
appliances and devices they used, and if they 
thought about their energy consumption at 
all. The four scenarios were then presented 
as a typical daily routine of someone living in 
2050, and reactions elicited.
Box 1. The Policy Delphi Method
Several projects have used Delphi (or variants, such as Policy Delphi [15]) methods to 
elicit stakeholder and/or expert views on energy system futures (e.g. EurEnDel; UK 
Foresight; SuperGen [16, 17]). Not all energy scenarios are developed through Delphi-
type techniques but its advantages include the ability to capture a range of expert 
(and potentially non-expert) views on a topic where the field is young (with little 
published literature), rapidly developing, controversial and/or where long-range 
predictions are required.
The Policy Delphi approach uses an iterative method in which there are several 
(usually two or three) ‘rounds’ of consultation, and participants are typically shown 
the results from the previous round to respond to (often by providing a revised 
response) and potentially reach a consensus. Data is collected anonymously so that 
participants can provide their views in an uninhibited fashion and are not tempted 
to follow the opinion of established figures in their area; eliminating stakeholder 
bias.
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Table 1. Research and stakeholder engagement methods
Method Sample 
Size
Timing Participants Aims Report 
Section
Policy 
Advisory 
Group
12 Every 6 
Months
Experts involved in smart 
grids (Ofgem, National 
Grid, DNOs, suppliers, 
technology companies, 
NGOs, academics).
To guide project on key 
smart grid issues, data 
collection and scenario 
development.
n/a
Expert 
Interviews
18 Feb-
Mar 
2012
Experts involved in smart 
grids and related issues 
(the UK Government, 
Ofgem, National Grid, 
DNOs, consultants, trade 
associations and NGOs).
To reveal as much of the 
landscape as possible to 
ensure no key element was 
omitted from the Policy 
Delphi expert survey.
2.1
Policy 
Delphi 
(Online 
Surveys)
Round 
1: 77
Apr 
2012
21 academics, 12 network 
operators, 6 consultants, 5 
interest groups, 5 suppliers, 
3 communities with SG 
experience, 3 policy-
makers, 1 generator, 1 
regulator, and 7 ‘other’ (13 
no response).
To identify critical 
technical, social and policy 
aspects of smart grids via 
a two-stage anonymous 
online survey tool.
2.2
Round 
2: 44
Sep 
2012
11 academics, 11 network 
operators, 4 suppliers, 2 
interest groups, 1 regulator, 
1 generator, 1 policy-maker, 
and 13 ‘other’.
Expert 
Workshop
20 May 
2013
Academic, industry, policy 
and third sector smart grid 
experts.
To feedback on draft 
scenarios and pathways.
2.3
Public 
Workshop
53 Sep-Oct 
2013
Four locations: two urban 
(Cardiff, Brixton) and two 
rural (Fintry, Mere Green); 
two with smart grid-
related experience (e.g. 
microgeneration) and two 
without.
51% male; range of 
age groups, education 
levels and household 
characteristicsi.
To explore public attitudes 
to smart grid issues 
and responses to draft 
scenarios via structured 
participatory exercises.
4.1
i Range of household and home types: 20.8% single-adult households, 52.8% live with one other 
adult. 62.3% do not have children at home. 49% semi-detached or detached house, 20.8% flat. 
Mean home 62 years. 86.8% have internet at home. 41.5% own their house outright, with most of 
the remainder having a mortgage.
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Research Findings
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This chapter presents the research findings 
from a series of in-depth interviews and a 
policy Delphi, and introduces the methodology 
employed for the construction of a small 
number of sociotechnical scenarios.
2.1 Smart grid landscape
This section describes the findings from 
the expert interviews, designed in order to 
identify the main themes to be explored and 
incorporated into the scenarios.
Predictability and uncertainty
The problem of predictability arose in a 
significant number of interviews, most 
commonly in regard to distribution networks, 
issues arising from the replacement of RPI-
Xii  with RIIOiii, and the uncertain needs of 
the electricity system. Many stakeholders 
felt uncertainty over how the potentially 
significant expansion of new energy 
technologies will shape the network and make 
it difficult to make definitive assessments, 
even over the next decade (relating directly to 
the 2015-2023 operating period of RIIO-ED1). 
No-one felt able to properly evaluate network 
needs or possible evolution beyond 2025, 
making it challenging to outline scenarios 
beyond 2030. This throws up the question of 
how regulation would need to evolve alongside 
developing technology and market services. 
Experience suggests that this would have to 
take into account the changing circumstances 
on an ongoing basis.
There is also considerable uncertainty in the 
medium to longer term:
• How do we move to more sophisticated 
systems and who pays for those?
• What will the demands on the system be 
after 2020, and how do we stay ahead of 
and fulfil these system demands?
• How will regulation evolve with technology 
and market services?
• How to give signals which allow flexibility 
beyond the end of the 2023 distribution 
price control review and provide sufficient 
information to allow DNOs to make 
decisions about post-2023 investment?
• Might a flexibility mechanism/review 
mechanism in RIIO-ED1 be a necessity 
once we have more information about how 
things work in practice?
The results of most Low Carbon Networks 
Fundiv  projects will not be available until after 
RIIO-ED1 starts, so there will be limited data 
about feasibility to inform its introduction. It 
is possible some benefits of RIIO might only 
really become apparent in practice, but so 
might the pitfalls.
Planning and investment by DNOs
Stakeholders agreed that previous 
assumptions about the network no longer 
held true and DNOs would have to respond 
differently. The change to the regulatory 
system for DNOs creates a new operational 
environment; DNOs will have a far more 
complex task and require more interaction 
than has been the case.
Since their privatisation, DNOs have tended to 
be conservative, low-risk and low-return. R&D 
investment fell dramatically as a result of 
regulatory incentives to minimise costs. DNOs 
will need to take more risks in adapting to the 
new realities of the system. More innovation 
will be required, adding considerably to 
costs, and requiring a bigger return. Risk 
management will become a key element of 
their overall management strategy and it is 
possible some will respond less capably to 
these challenges.
DNOs will need to trade off primary assets 
(e.g. wires) against more advanced control 
and it is likely that the balance of this trade-
off will change over time, with important 
ii Retail Price Index, excluding mortgage interest payments
iii Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs: A performance based model for setting the network companies’ price 
controls by the regulator Ofgem
iv Ofgem set up the Low Carbon Networks (LCN) Fund as part of the electricity distribution price control that runs until 
31 March 2015. The LCN Fund allows up to £500m to support projects sponsored by the Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs) to try out new technology, operating and commercial arrangements.
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implications for effective regulation. The level 
of risk that Ofgem will tolerate will also be 
significant in future distribution price control 
reviews. There is potential conflict between 
Ofgem’s perspective on allowable risk and 
the direction the DNOs (and transmission 
networks) want to take, either collectively or 
individually. This may constrain innovation.
Linked to this is the issue of whether Ofgem 
would allow investment ahead of need, and 
if so, to what extent. A conservative response 
from Ofgem could decelerate innovation 
and limit appetite for risk. It was generally 
agreed that Ofgem would prefer to see third 
parties involved in innovation on distribution 
networks, partnering with DNOs. While this 
has value in terms of offsetting risk it might 
also mean a complex double sales process 
with no guarantee of return.
Another issue for stakeholders was when 
development should begin - in 2015, 2023 
or somewhere in between? There are some 
key low carbon technologies which will 
present serious challenges for the current 
electricity system. Rapid expansion of even 
one of these could require significant changes. 
Effective system operation will depend on 
how fast DNOs can respond.  Thus, a key 
question regarding investment and smart grid 
development was whether to include smarter 
technology ahead of the curve or go slowly to 
reduce costs and try to react quickly to sudden 
change (e.g. EV uptake). Given the new DNO 
incentives, much will depend on how they 
respond in terms of forward planning.
At the time of writing, six DNOs have been 
considered for fast-tracking under RIIO-ED1 
with only one being successful. Since fast-
tracking was seen as an attractive incentive 
by the experts we interviewed, this may reflect 
problems for DNOs in understanding what 
would be required from them. Submissions 
by the six DNOs also included proposed 
innovation strategies.  However, four failed to 
satisfy Ofgem’s minimum requirements and 
only one made a success case for funding 
above the default level of 0.5% for its Network 
Innovation Allowance.
Supply sector
Suppliers’ concerns were more focussed on 
the impact of increased transmission and 
distribution costs on bills. They were less 
worried about demand management as 
long as power stays on. This is significant, 
since suppliers have the potential to take a 
leading role in addressing demand amongst 
consumers, due to their relationship with the 
consumer.
Coordination
One fairly common concern was a perceived 
lack of vision in planning for smarter energy 
delivery beyond 2020, and a desire for more 
coordination was often expressed. Many 
stakeholders thought the Smart Grid Forum 
was a step in the right direction but that 
more coordination would be needed, with the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) singled out as needing to provide a 
coherent lead.
Local grid issues
In the past, assumptions about technologies 
such as EVs and heat pumps were that they 
would be evenly distributed, but DNOs now 
think high concentrations in specific area is 
more likely (e.g. EVs in London or ground-
source heat pumps in areas off the gas grid). 
This will require development of smart 
grids on a ‘hotspot’ basis, with multiple 
implications. Where clustering occurs in areas 
with little system headroom there is greater 
likelihood of problems. The lack of information 
which DNOs currently have on rural networks 
and the lack of flexibility inherent in them 
may need more work to justify the precise 
scale of the problem. ‘Hotspot’ development 
will mean variable levels of smartness across 
energy networks; thus the degree of smartness 
may vary strongly on a geographical basis.
Smart meter rollout
A substantial number of stakeholders were 
concerned about the limits of the smart meter 
rollout planned for 2016-19 and its enabling 
communications system. Many outlined the 
problems of the supplier-led smart meter 
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roll out and the conflicting supplier priority 
of minimising costs and the DNO desire to 
enhance functionality.
Views differed as to when and how smart 
meters, which go beyond the ‘smartness’ of 
the initial roll out models, would be needed. 
This will depend both on the smartness of the 
typical meter installed and the rapidity with 
which their limits are reached. It is unclear 
whether demand for particular data will lead 
to any upgrading as a result of the broken 
value chain. The move to more advanced 
meters may eventually be limited by the 
longevity of the initially rolled out meters.
There was concern over the quality of the 
communications system being introduced 
to gather data from smart meters. Some 
stakeholders felt that DECC’s budgeting would 
mean severe limits on bandwidth, meaning 
little potential to expand beyond simple meter 
reading, regardless of the functionality of 
the meters. Many felt a second generation 
communication system might have to be 
introduced relatively quickly.
Consumer engagement
There was considerable uncertainty about 
the level of consumer engagement that will 
emerge, and industry stakeholders (e.g. DNOs) 
seem unlikely to act on data estimating 
levels of engagement unless it comes with 
a high degree of certainty (e.g. from real 
world data). Non-engagement may limit the 
options available to DNOs, new entrants to 
the UK electricity supply industry, such as 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs), and for 
overall system balancing.
Issues such as access to data, time-of-
use tariffs, smart-enabled domestic goods 
and willingness to shift energy usage will 
impact substantially on the ability of other 
stakeholders to provide new services and 
apply new methods to system management. 
This presents a potential ‘chicken-and-egg’ 
scenario, which could limit uptake of more 
advanced consumer-related services unless 
action is taken to open up markets.
Skills shortages
Several stakeholders mentioned a skills 
shortfall amongst power companies. There 
was doubt as to whether human resources 
departments were ready to respond to 
the changing situation regarding their 
organisations’ skills. Power electronics and 
telecommunication skills were cited as 
necessities, alongside modelling expertise 
for DNOs. Concern was also expressed that 
DNOs may have sufficient skills to handle Low 
Carbon Networks Fund projects but not to roll 
out knowledge gained more widely.
2.2 Smart grid drivers, 
barriers and functionalities
Building on the expert interviews, our two-
stage Policy Delphi online survey explored 
in more detail smart grid benefits, pitfalls, 
drivers, barriers and functionalities as 
elucidated by experts and stakeholders. 
Findings from the Policy Delphi survey are 
summarised in this section.
Benefits and pitfalls of smart grids
Broadly, experts agreed on the need to 
make electrical delivery smarter, and that 
smart grids can afford various benefits. Cost 
reductions were the most cited expected 
benefit, while investment risk was the most 
cited pitfall of smart grids (Box 2). Experts 
expect that smart grids will deliver significant 
cost reductions for the grid, via deferred 
investment, efficiency savings, or otherwise, 
provided that the costs of implementation and 
maintenance of the required technologies can 
be met.
 
Yet not all the solutions involved in making 
the grid smarter were viewed favourably, with 
a measurable proportion of experts finding 
them unproven, underdeveloped, complex and 
difficult to implement. The expected benefits 
of a functional smart grid involve facilitation 
of renewable energy, better network balancing, 
and emissions reduction – all of which are 
high on government energy and climate 
agendas. However, customer protection (e.g. 
against price rises) was not generally seen as 
an important functionality. Rather, economic 
and technical benefits seemed to be prioritised 
over social ones.
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At the same time, consumer engagement, 
community involvement, the potential for 
demand management but also potential 
resistance to it, were also identified as both 
potential benefits and pitfalls. Data protection 
and privacy was clearly identified as a 
problematic aspect inherent to smart grids, 
demanding greater transparency and data 
protection safeguards to gain customer trust.
Drivers and barriers of smart grids
We explored drivers and barriers to smart 
grids within the following areas:
Standards and technical issues. Smart metering 
and communications are paramount here; 
more specifically, the need for standardisation 
of metering functionality, communication 
protocols and technologies to drive a smarter 
grid, as well as effective device rollout. Other 
issues deemed crucial for smart grids include 
active network monitoring, the method and 
timing of devices’ communication with each 
other and with the network, and particularly 
the way data is shared and stored. In addition 
there was an array of lower-priority issues 
such as the capacity of networks to support 
EVs.
Data handling. Data protection, security, and 
privacy guarantees emerged as the key issues 
here. Concerns around cyber security, the 
willingness of companies to share data with 
each other and with the network, and then 
the security of this data once collected and/
or shared are all likely to have a substantial 
impact on customer trust and cooperation. 
Other issues raised included the minimum 
level of transparency to make data useful 
to companies, and the limits of what energy 
providers may be able to do with this data.
Market structure, regulation, and coordination 
between DECC and Ofgem. In contrast to 
the technical areas above, there was less 
agreement here on the priority drivers/
barriers, exposing a broad spectrum of policy 
and regulatory topics. One recurrent theme 
was fragmentation of the energy system 
and markets; with players at many levels 
either having conflicting interests or lacking 
clearly defined responsibilities, resulting in 
inertia in the system and calls for restructure. 
Another recurrent theme was consistency 
and coordination between market players 
and in policy and regulation, so that clear 
and consistent messages (including a long-
term vision and commitment to change) are 
communicated to the market.
Customer engagement. This area included the 
clear communication of potential smart grid 
benefits to consumers and the understanding 
of consumer responses to smart grid 
capabilities (e.g. shifting consumption to off-
peak) and associated changes (e.g. pricing, 
customer-tailored solutions). 
Box 2. Expert opinion on the benefits and pitfalls of smart grids (open-ended 
survey question)
The top-cited expected benefits from smart grids were (% of experts):
• Cost reduction in different levels of the system (39%)
• Improved efficiency in generation, delivery and use of assets (39%)
• Facilitation of renewable energy sources of electricity (24%)
• Emissions reductions (24%)
The top-cited expected pitfalls of smart grids were (% of experts):
• Costs or lacking/risky investment (42%)
• Disengaged or uncooperative customers (27%)
• Complexity or difficult-to-manage solutions (21%)
• Data protection/privacy concerns (18%)
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Investment. Risk aversion was seen as the 
most important barrier and the most 
important pitfall (Box 2). Uncertainty of 
return on investment and about government 
commitment and regulation are a financially 
unattractive combination; this limits 
willingness to fund any changes on the grid, 
for fear that broader changes may not be 
implemented, or that implementation may 
not last long enough for investments to return 
profits.
Functions of smart grids
Next, we examined potential and expected 
functions of smart grids and whether these 
were essential, desirable or not important. 
From a list of 20 potential functions of smart 
grids, identified from previous research, and 
to which experts could add further functions, 
five were chosen as essential by over 70% 
of experts (Table 2) and were not voted ‘not 
important’ by any respondents. Few significant 
differences by background or gender were 
found (although ‘To protect vulnerable 
consumers from price increases’, was seen 
as essential more by social scientists and 
engineers than by business or ‘other’ sector 
respondents).
We then examined the interdependency and 
spatial aspects (i.e. critical prerequisite steps 
and geographical differences) of these top 
five functions, along with energy storage (the 
most popular ‘other’ option freely  proposed  
by the survey participants). Given its potential 
for reducing the need for any of the other 
functions of a smart grid, energy storage may 
also be identified as a potential branching 
point for smart grid development.
With the exception of function 2, where 
the installation of monitoring and control 
equipment was clearly prioritised, followed 
by smart meters (for monitoring and 
perhaps control at a domestic level) there 
was generally a wide spread of opinions 
on what constitutes prerequisite steps for 
each function. These included addressing 
generation forecasting and DSR for function 
1, smart meter installation and customer 
acceptance (function 3), installing monitoring, 
metering and control technology, and 
resolving responsibilities among energy 
market players (function 4).
Of the six functions, four were expected to be 
implemented either through trials gradually 
being connected to the grid, or in parts of the 
network that are in critical need. In contrast, 
function 3 (deployment of demand side 
technologies) was primarily expected to be 
implemented by rollout, with local trials as a 
second option; and function 5 (integration of 
active loads) was equally expected to occur via 
local trials to be connected gradually, and on 
an ad hoc basis.
  
In terms of likelihood of implementation, 
all functions were judged as likely to be 
implemented, albeit to a low or moderate 
extent (Figure 2).
Table 2. Essential smart grid functions
Function % of experts
rating ‘essential’
1. To balance a power grid with a large share of intermittent renewable 
generation
82
2. To increase observability and controllability of the power grid 75
3. To enable deployment of demand side response technologies 74
4. To enable active network management 73
5. To allow integration of active loads (e.g. electric vehicles, heat pumps) 71
6. To facilitate energy storage* 12
* This was the most popular unprompted function offered freely by the survey participants
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Figure 1. Expected method of implementing each function*
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Figure 2. Expected likelihood of implementing each function in different geographical contexts
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There was no negative expectation for 
any of the functions, reinforcing their 
perceived importance. The most likely 
functions expected to be implemented were 
observability and controllability of the grid 
(function 2), followed by integration of active 
loads (function 5). Facilitating energy storage 
(function 6) received the lowest likelihood 
ratings, perhaps reflecting our assumption of 
storage being a branching point in smart grid 
development.
In terms of spatial variation, there was 
an expectation that virtually all functions 
would be more likely to be implemented in 
urban settings than in rural ones; this was 
particularly the case for DSR technologies, 
active load management, and controllability 
(Figure 2).
2.3 Scenario pathways and 
their plausibility
We used the Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) 
method of scenario development [18] (Box 3). 
 
Analysing the subject area we identified key 
dimensions (or ‘sectors’) such as government 
policy, and three or four alternatives futures 
within each sectors (known as ‘factors’). In 
the case of government policy, for example, 
these may be strong or weak policy support 
for low carbon technologies (LCTs). The seven 
sectors are listed below (see Figure 3 for full 
descriptions):
The key variables identified, as in Figure 3, 
were laid out in a 7x4 sector/factor array, titled 
MUDSPIN, after the first letter of each sector. 
The co-existence of each factor in a sector 
was checked against another one across the 
other sectors by assigning a consistency rating 
between -3 and 3. Consistency ratings were 
discussed and agreed upon by pairs of project 
team members and reviewed by the team as a 
whole.
The Parmenides software package was 
used to calculate consistency rating of each 
combination (made up of average pairwise 
ratings) and to rank the most consistent 
combinations. These were then checked for 
contradictions, and empirical and normative 
constraints. The surviving combinations were 
grouped together to form similar clusters 
which could conceivably move from one 
combination to another – the most subjective 
element of the process – which were in turn 
then ordered into an intuitive sequence of ‘can 
I see this world leading to that one?’ [18].
This process resulted in a sequence of events, 
branching out into the future in a tree-
like diagram (Figure 4), to which we then 
applied the earlier findings to give richer 
detail. By assessing and evaluating different 
combinations, these pathways were developed 
into four scenarios.
 
The plausibility of different pathways for each 
scenario and their coherence and timescales 
were discussed at the expert workshop, 
revealing a range of issues and considerable 
divergence of opinion (especially in relation to 
new technologies and associated measures). 
We outline findings that had the most impact 
upon subsequent scenario development.
Policy and Regulation: There was a strong 
feeling amongst participants that RIIO and 
Electricity Market Reform would be central to 
many of the initiatives that would determine 
the overall smartness of future energy delivery 
Box 3. The Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) Method
This approach is highly structured and transparent and, unlike many scenario 
development exercises, does not constrain outcomes to a certain number of 
scenarios. FAR is able to take into account many more factors than a twin-axis 
framework and analyse their combinations systematically to gain insight into how 
the pathways branch out into the future.
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– in the short term at least. In the longer term, 
network smartness is likely to be driven by the 
generation mix, and therefore policy measures 
designed to encourage or discourage certain 
types of generation will have significant 
impact on the way in networks will develop 
over the coming decades. 
Given the central focus of RIIO and EMR, 
government uncertainty is seen as being, 
by far, the greatest risk and the most 
substantial barrier. Government actions are 
therefore a driver and a barrier to smart grid 
development. As the government has many, 
often competing, objectives and concerns, 
other than environmental ones, that may have 
an impact on network smartness.
Markets The extent to which new energy services emerge
Users Both the overall level of demand and its flexibility
Data & Information The availability of data from smart meters and substations
Supply Mix The defining characteristics of the power generation system
Policy The strength of government support for low carbon technologies
Investment Conditions The investment and regulatory context
Networks The extent of smart technology implementation by networks
Figure 3. Smart grid scenario key variables
•	 Low	increase	in	demand,	passive	consumers
•	 High	increase	in	demand,	passive	consumers
•	 Low	increase	in	demand,	active	consumers
•	 High	increase	in	demand,	active	consumers
•	 Billing	information	only,	plus	basic	
network	data
•	 Aggregated	historical	data	only
•	 Aggregated	near	to	R-	‐T	D	available
•	 Disaggregated	near	to	R-	‐T	D	available
•	 Low	growth	in	NES,	existing	actors
•	 Low	growth	in	NES,	new	actors
•	 High	growth	in	NES,	existing	actors
•	 High	growth	in	NES,	new	actors
•	 Characterised	by	inflexible	generation
•	 Characterised	by	flexible	generation
•	 Characterised	by	variable	generation
•	 Weak	incentives	with	no	coordination	of	SED
•	 Strong	incentives	with	no	coordination	of	SED
•	 Weak	incentives	with	coordination	of	SED
•	 Strong	incentives	with	coordination	of	SED
•	 Passive	DN	management
•	 Partially	active	DN
•	 Fully	active	DN	management
Markets
Policy
Data and Information
Supply Mix
Users
Networks
•	 Expensive	capital	with	obstructive	REF
•	 Cheap	capital	with	obstructive	REF
•	 Expensive	capital	with	constructive	REF
•	 Cheap	capital	with	constructive	REF
Investment Conditions
Legend
	 	Smart	grids	with	different	functions	
and	capabilities
DN	 distribution	network
NES	 new	energy	related	services
R- T D	 real-	‐time	data
REF	 regulatory	investment	framework
SED	 smarter	energy	delivery
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Figure 4. The Faustian Tree
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For example, if supply security drives greater 
gas generation, then supply side flexibility 
may negate much of the need for advanced 
DSR technologies (though there may still be 
system and cost benefits from having some 
DSR). Further, since policy is formulated and 
implemented at a national level, incentives 
for DNOs to act in certain ways are likely to 
lead to a degree of uniformity (or similarity) 
in DNO behaviour. Similarly, local/community 
or regional communications infrastructure is 
unlikely to develop in place of a system co-
ordinated at a national level. However, this 
is not to say that subnational actors do not 
have a role to play: it was felt in some cases 
that local authority involvement in the energy 
system could affect network development.
RIIO: Many participants recognised that RIIO 
failing to achieve any meaningful change is a 
possible outcome. Some highlighted the ‘cliff-
edge’ for commercial actors trying to attract 
new customers; because regulation starts 
once they have more than a certain number, 
there is an incentive either to remain small or 
become very big very quickly. There was also 
discussion around how the outcome of RIIO 
should be regarded. Participants agreed that it 
should not be seen simply as smart vs. not-
smart – instead the question is whether RIIO 
provides enough of a stimulus to sufficiently 
incentivise DNOs to seek out new behaviours, 
leading to three plausible outcomes: RIIO 
stimulates change as intended, less than 
intended, or not at all.
Technological: The effectiveness of policy 
measures designed to encourage or discourage 
certain types of generation were perceived 
as having a significant impact on how 
networks will develop (see Policy/Regulatory 
above). Different conceptions of ‘smartness’ 
were also raised. In keeping with our Smart 
Power Sector scenario, the first is a high 
level of ‘smartness’ on the generation and 
supply side (e.g. including storage and large 
amounts of interconnection to mainland 
Europe) and sees smart metering succeeding 
in engaging consumers in greater numbers 
(see Consumers, below). Such a system may 
be very smart on the generation side in rural 
areas (with advanced monitoring and control 
systems) but less smart in consumption, 
which may, for example, be restricted to 
key technologies such as EVs rather than 
widespread adoption of DSR-relevant products 
in customers’ homes. There was an extremely 
wide range of opinions on when certain 
technologies may be introduced. Estimates 
placed the emergence of both grid-scale 
storage and the advent of residential real-time 
pricing over a twenty year timeframe. This 
is consistent with psychological research on 
difficulties conceptualising the future [19].
Finance: There was some observation that the 
cost of capital could be largely irrelevant for 
any scenario. There is currently cheap capital 
available but very little investment, due to 
regulatory and policy uncertainty. Additionally, 
DNOs are currently able to access debt at 
low cost because they are low risk. Requiring 
them to take on more risk (as expected via the 
changes in pricing mechanisms, i.e. RIIO) may 
adversely affect their risk profiles from the 
point of view of investors, thus increasing the 
costs of financing any smart investments.
Consumers: There was a very strong concern, 
regularly expressed, that consumers will 
be unlikely to play a very active role in the 
development of smart grids until quite 
a late stage in the scenarios. It was felt 
that regulation, rather than pressure from 
consumers, would drive the behaviour of 
DNOs. However, it was suggested that if 
consumers do become active, they are unlikely 
to return to passivity. There were questions 
around the description of consumers 
becoming ‘active’; this might be better 
expressed by asking what types of services 
they will use. A radical alternative to this 
conception of the consumer’s role is that of a 
‘consumer-only’ smart system, in which there 
is less smart generation and supply but end 
users, predominantly in urban areas (and not 
only in the domestic sector), have become 
smarter in how they use energy. Despite 
the generally-anticipated lack of consumer 
involvement, it was the view of most 
participants that more advanced smart meters 
will achieve significant penetration around 
2025 as the old ones will need replacing. This 
will be a market, rather than a policy decision, 
so will happen regardless.
Markets: There was a general view expressed 
by one group that entrepreneurial activity 
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is likely to occur in niches and that how 
this is managed or encouraged, and how 
new techniques emerge into wider use, is 
a question for competition policy as well 
as regulation. A particular concern was 
raised that despite being incentivised by the 
network innovation programmes to trial new 
technologies, DNOs might lack the incentives 
(or the skills) to roll out these technologies 
further. New companies may expand and 
remain independent, or they may be bought 
up by dominant players and either nurtured 
or stifled. The latter might affect transition to 
greater smartness by limiting the competition 
in the market. This progress could well depend 
on the degree to which incumbents choose to 
adopt and explore new technologies.
Scenarios: With regard to specific feedback 
for the scenarios presented to the group, it 
was suggested that Smart Power Sector and 
Smart 2050 might in fact be very similar up 
until roughly the year 2030, after which they 
would diverge due to the absence of consumer 
engagement. Some felt the regulator is 
unlikely to act unless levels of EVs, heat 
pumps and renewables become significant, 
because very smart networks simply won’t be 
needed otherwise. It was felt that ‘partially’ 
active networks therefore serve no purpose. 
Prior to the workshop our Minimum Smart 
scenario had contained high volumes of 
nuclear generation towards 2050. Experts 
felt this would in fact drive more smart and 
ancillary services and so looks out of place in 
2050. It has therefore been removed, although 
it was recognised that it is possible for more 
nuclear to appear later than 2050, and that 
if this were the case, nuclear adoption could 
act as a branching point. For example, new 
reactor designs and additional smart services 
would mean that we might as well continue 
down that pathway. It was also noted that a 
pathway characterised by inflexible generation 
is less plausible as by the time nuclear power 
plants are built there would be a similar 
amount of variable generation. Finally, there 
was agreement that more work was needed 
on the market structure dimension within 
the Groundswell scenario; in particular, closer 
examination of how the broken value chain 
might be addressed in order to encourage 
better and more rapid innovation, which is 
highly unlikely to occur without an adequate 
profit motive, and is a direct consequence of 
the lack of competition within the market.
Box 4. Active and passive networks
Active and passive networks. ‘Passive’ 
distribution networks mostly have 
power only flowing to the consumer. 
‘Active’ networks may have micro, 
small or medium scale generators, 
and residential customers with higher 
loads (e.g. an EV). Active networks 
need real-time monitoring and 
management, but offer opportunities 
for an increased range of services to 
consumers. They may offer improved 
operational security through 
increased levels of automation.
Box 5. Ancillary services
A range of services necessary to the 
efficient running of the electricity 
system that are outside the basic 
needs of generating and delivering 
power. Some of these (such as 
regulation and reactive power) are 
required during normal operations 
to maintain the necessary balance 
between generation and load in real 
time and maintain voltages within 
the required ranges. Other ancillary 
services (such as contingency 
reserves) provide insurance 
against minor problems becoming 
catastrophes. Finally, black start 
services are required to restore 
the bulk-power system to normal 
operations after a major outage.
Smart Grid Scenarios
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This chapter presents the scenarios in 
narrative form, as they were developed 
following a lengthy data collection process. 
Each of the four scenarios is described in 
detail, followed by discussion of how it is 
possible to move between scenarios, and the 
impact of wildcards.
In Figure 4, each scenario building block 
corresponds to a combination of MUDSPIN 
sector/factor array choices. Scenario 
narratives were developed in order to describe 
the most influential characteristics, those 
that define the progression along the pathway, 
and these were set to a chronology following 
the expert workshop. As already noted, the 
scenarios outlined are not forecasts, but 
illustrate plausible future energy system 
pathways and the interactions that are likely 
to shape their development.
Figure 5 summarises the key steps across 
the four scenarios. In the Minimum Smart 
scenario a lack of coordination and long-term 
vision coincides with weak consumer buy-in 
and results in the need to purchase carbon 
credits to meet environmental targets. The 
level and scope of smartness for this scenario 
are therefore low.
The Groundswell scenario, in contrast, sees 
strong consumer interest in and engagement 
with the energy system, resulting at least 
partially from increased national concern over 
the declining capacity margin and the upward 
trend in energy prices. This causes a radical 
paradigm shift at a community and local 
authority level, leading some areas to generate 
their own electricity and sometimes even 
manage their networks.
The Smart Power Sector scenario features 
highly resistant consumers. Smart grid 
developments therefore take place ‘behind 
the scenes’, although this means there are 
limits to what can be achieved. DNOs are, 
however, incentivised to do what they need to 
do in order to deal (much later on) with the 
emergence of EVs. There is a greater role for 
interconnection with Europe and grid-scale 
storage.
Smart 2050 sets the upper boundary for our 
scenarios. Well-coordinated and coherent 
policy action builds strong consumer 
engagement, resulting in a greater number 
of smart grid-support services. Engagement 
differs here from the Groundswell scenario in 
that it is driven by policy and the availability 
of desirable options, leading to the emergence 
of a different set of technologies and changing 
the nature of the smart grid correspondingly.
The scenarios are discussed in detail in the 
next sections in decadal timespans across 
broad categories of Supply, Demand and 
Networks.
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3.1 Minimum Smart
Defining characteristics:
• A substantial amount of flexible generation 
results in a reduced need for smart 
technologies.
• Consumers remain mostly passive and not 
interested in adopting DSM.
• Network smartening only occurs as 
and when it is required or equipment is 
replaced.
• Substantial barriers remain, both to 
market reform and new market entrants.
• International permits and interconnectors 
are used to meet climate targets.
• Energy prices continue to rise.
Now – 2020
Supply Side
The UK’s fitful economic recovery means 
environmental objectives are low on the 
political agenda and the priority remains 
the restoration of growth. There is continued 
pressure on DECC from industry and the 
government to reduce financial support for 
green policies. The Treasury offers tax breaks 
to the shale gas industry and introduces 
policies that conflict with DECC’s long-term 
carbon reduction objectives. At the end of the 
decade a number of coal power stations shut 
due to the Large Combustion Plant Directive, 
most nuclear stations are reaching the end 
of their working lives, and the share of gas 
in the UK generation mix increases steadily, 
aided by the capacity mechanism. Although 
wind generation continues to grow there is 
little willingness to adopt more ambitious 
policy measures in this area. The strike prices 
established under the Contract for Difference 
for low carbon generation act as a price 
guarantee for the nuclear industry, with the 
government willing to amend this in line with 
perceived need. In the middle of the decade 
construction begins on new plants.
Demand Side
Smart meters are installed in homes and 
small businesses. Although capable of more, 
they are used only for the relaying of billing 
information. The accompanying in-home 
displays show energy consumption in financial 
terms but consumers are not engaging well, in 
part because trust in energy suppliers remains 
low. Consumer energy consumption patterns 
show no sign of changing and there appears 
to be little appetite for what bill payers regard 
as quite intrusive DSR technologies, such as 
devices that suggest alternative times to run 
appliances. Due to an installation process 
of varying quality, including problems in 
billing systems and an inadequate public 
information campaign, public support for the 
process is lukewarm. This slows down the 
rollout and the number of meters installed 
by 2020 is lower than originally anticipated. 
Energy prices continue to rise as political 
momentum towards a gas-centred system 
gathers pace, but public antipathy towards 
onshore renewables and other green policies 
remains sizeable.
Networks
Despite weak policy and regulatory guidance 
smart technologies are developing and being 
put to use. DNOs, motivated by cost savings, 
install smart monitoring equipment at 
medium voltage substations, as and when it 
is necessary, but in the absence of significant 
increases in demand levels DNO innovation 
remains low. The eight-year time span of 
RIIO-ED1 does little to drive innovation; DNOs 
are not motivated by the need for substantial 
innovation in the early part of the RIIO-ED1 
period up to 2020 as they are uncertain of the 
extent to which enhanced smartness will be 
needed within the 2020-2023 period. Further, 
much of the requirement for connection 
to networks in the RIIO-ED1 period can be 
met with existing capacity – current system 
headroom is sufficient in many cases. In the 
absence of a clear pathway for carrying over 
the value of investment in innovation from 
ED1 to ED2, DNOs wait for RIIO-ED2 to begin 
before enacting cost-saving measures so that 
they can receive the maximum financial 
benefit from doing so. DNOs continue to 
engage with the Low Carbon Networks Fund, 
then the Network Innovation Competitions 
and the Network Innovation Allowance. A 
basic communication infrastructure is put 
in place alongside the national smart meter 
rollout and the Data and Communications 
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Company, Data Services Providers and 
Communications Service Providers begin to 
operate. However, the functionality of the 
system is limited to automated meter reading.
As of 2013, National Grid have already been 
working with DECC and Ofgem towards a 
stated goal of devising possible additional 
safeguards to try to address some of the risks 
which might threaten system security in 
the near term. Two possible new balancing 
services have been suggested: Demand 
Side Balancing Reserve and Supplemental 
Balancing Reserve [20,21]. The primary 
goal is to give National Grid more options 
in the case of narrowing capacity margins, 
particularly in 2013/14 and 2014/15. Demand 
Side Balancing Reserve is also intended to lay 
down regulations which will be conducive to 
the possible growth in demand side services 
within the developing context of the Electricity 
Market Reform.
2020 – 2030
Supply Side
The UK fails to meet its 2020 renewable 
energy targets as the policy focus has been 
on securing supply through increased gas 
generation. The public stance towards onshore 
wind farms and other renewable technologies, 
such as large-scale photovoltaics (PV), remains 
lukewarm as consumers associate rising 
electricity prices with environmental policies. 
Increases in offshore wind energy continue 
to prove tough to finance at the scale needed 
to hit the 2020 targets and the sources of 
capital needed prefer to look to onshore wind 
development and other renewable energy 
sources outside the UK. Offshore wind does 
continue to expand below the levels of the 
targets and by the mid-2020s the energy 
system incorporates around 15GW. Policy 
encouraging the construction and operation 
of gas-fired power stations over the previous 
decade and support for the exploration and 
exploitation of UK reserves spurs on the 
development of the shale industry. This offers 
a modest improvement to UK energy security, 
but does little to reduce consumer prices.
The implementation of the IED means that 
coal-fired stations must either become cleaner 
still or cease to generate by the early 2020s. 
The rising carbon price floor reduces their 
competitiveness, and together these policies 
significantly reduce the total remaining 
coal capacity – much of it to be replaced 
by gas. Those coal stations still running 
often do so as part of the Capacity Market, 
receiving payment in return for availability. 
Opportunities for grid-scale storage remain 
limited. 
The majority of remaining nuclear capacity 
has shut down by 2023 despite debate over 
allowing continued operation with extended 
licences. Sizewell B remains the only 
operational plant from the earlier generation 
plants. The debate about new nuclear capacity 
is still running and no site for a high-level 
waste repository has been found. The plant 
commissioned in the mid-2010s is still being 
built owing to regulatory, legal and technical 
difficulties. The government increases the 
subsidy available in order to encourage 
investment in new nuclear build but this 
results in only one or two new agreements.
Demand Side
Smart metering in the residential sector 
results in small sustained savings in the 
region of only 2-3%. However, more small 
and medium-sized enterprises are signing 
up to various services to help manage use 
and improve efficiency, with third party 
demand aggregators  using half-hourly data to 
negotiate better deals for business customers. 
Large industrial users continue to provide 
near-to-real-time data and this spreads slowly 
into the smaller-scale commercial sector. 
As prices rise, smaller industrial users see 
advantages in contracts that had previously 
only been relevant for large users, and some 
participate in the Capacity Market through 
aggregators. More sophisticated agreements 
between suppliers and consumers emerge and 
the ‘Big Six’ power companies, still dominant, 
compete to provide the most flexible 
contracts. There is therefore a small amount 
of DSR available in the system that can be 
called on at time of peak demand.
Networks
Communication networks gradually improve 
32
and expand to give better coverage. Although 
now smarter as a result, the lack of vision 
of policymakers and co-ordination from 
major industry players means that the power 
system is developing in a piecemeal fashion. 
As the industry remains fragmented, the 
split incentive problem persists, under which 
benefits do not accrue to those paying for 
them.
As a consequence of the Renewable Heat 
Incentive the number of ground- and 
air-source heat pump installations rises, 
predominantly in areas off the gas grid. Where 
clustering occurs, DNOs experience some 
localised difficulties at low voltage substations 
as locations off the gas grid correlate with 
the weaker parts of the distribution networks. 
Substations are simply upgraded by traditional 
means to handle the additional demand as the 
costs of smart solutions are still too high.
2030 – 2040
Supply Side
Having reached 20GW of total wind capacity 
in the early 2030s, there is a need for 
some smart technology in certain areas to 
handle the more variable supply. Although 
research and development continues and 
improvements are being made, the relative 
costs of storage technologies are still 
considerably higher than those of gas-fired 
peaking plant. The generation mix consists of 
a small number of nuclear stations, many gas 
generators, and an assortment of renewables. 
These are deployed in an ad hoc fashion and 
consist mainly of wind but there are also some 
medium-scale solar PV farms, and a very 
small amount of newer technologies, such 
as tidal-stream devices. Modest amounts of 
microgeneration feed into the grid, but remain 
unproblematic for the DNOs.
Demand Side
In-home displays for smart meters remain 
a niche market but those available now 
have greater functionality. They are popular 
principally with customers with an active 
interest in their energy consumption or those 
who own an EV and are attempting to get the 
best value when charging it. The rate of heat 
pump installation has dropped as many of the 
properties that would benefit the most have 
had them installed.
Networks 
Early in the decade EVs are still relatively 
uncommon and tend to be found only in 
affluent urban areas, meaning DNOs rarely 
have to consider the impact that they were 
having on the local distribution network. 
More often than not, simply increasing the 
capacity of local transformers is sufficient to 
handle the increased power flows. Monitoring 
equipment is sometimes installed in areas 
that are likely to see rising numbers of EVs 
so that the networks are able to spot any 
congestion before it becomes problematic.
2040 – 2050
Supply Side
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal 
plants develops to the point where it can 
generate competitively, although this reduces 
the overall flexibility of the system and has 
an impact on consumer bills. The UK meets 
neither European nor domestic legislative 
renewables and emissions commitments. 
Investment in gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ has 
left a legacy of gas power stations that are 
expensive to close and the country therefore 
attempts to meet climate obligations through 
the purchase of carbon credits on the 
international market, which is increasingly 
expensive. A small amount of nuclear still 
contributes to the generation mix, although 
this is scheduled to cease operating in the 
decade following 2050.
Demand Side
Although the growth of electricity demand 
is offset to some extent by energy efficiency 
programmes, they have not been sufficiently 
successful to reverse the trend of rising 
demand over the decades. This increase has 
not been accompanied by a rise in demand 
side flexibility, and the familiar peaks in the 
demand profile are exacerbated by the rise in 
demand from the (albeit limited) adoption of 
heat pumps and EVs. The costs of constructing 
and operating a much greater amount of gas 
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peaking plant and, making the necessary 
network upgrades, are borne by consumers.
Networks
The distribution network has patches of 
smartness that were developed to deal with 
demand fluctuations as necessary.  EVs 
become more of a problem in some urban 
areas. Additional adoption of heat pumps also 
places further stresses on the system.
Apart from this, the distribution networks look 
and function similarly to the last 20-30 years. 
This means that research and development 
is limited, but those companies actively 
pursuing smart technologies are achieving 
more success in exporting technology and 
services.
State of the world in 2050
 
In the Minimum Smart scenario the lack of 
drivers for system change means that the 
energy system has seen the least movement 
from the current profile (Figure 6). Power 
is generated in bulk at remote locations, 
transmitted nationally and then distributed 
to households and businesses through the 
distribution networks. The generation profile 
has altered slowly over four decades to 
2050 – old nuclear power stations have been 
replaced with new ones and renewables 
make up a greater proportion of the overall 
mix. Gas generation has supplanted coal to 
a large degree. There have been substantial 
upgrades to parts of the distribution networks 
to accommodate increases in demand in 
places but operationally and organisationally 
the DNOs are very similar to how they are in 
2014. Most householders remain passive and 
do not take action to control and reduce their 
energy use and their engagement with the 
energy is limited to the size of their bill. Very 
few consumers adopt distributed generation 
technologies and the widespread conception 
of top-down, centralised generation 
perseveres. A lack of consumer trust in 
utilities and the absence of significant new 
entrants to the sector, combined with a lack 
of engagement, means there are insufficient 
drivers for significant uptake of demand side 
management (DSM).
Figure 6. Minimum Smart Scenario
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3.2 Groundswell 
Defining characteristics:
• Strong and growing interest in home 
energy efficiency and alternative energy 
technologies by consumers.
• Adoption of distributed generation through 
community projects, with some moving 
away from reliance on grid electricity.
• New market entrants in energy supply, 
aggregation, and growth of energy services 
companies.
• Few policy interventions, with the policy 
largely playing catch-up with public 
attitudes.
Now – 2020
Supply Side
The amount of wind generation on the system 
grows from 10GW, but development is largely 
at offshore sites. The Large Combustion Plant 
Directive ensures the closure of a number of 
coal-fired stations by the middle of the decade 
with gas generation taking its place. The 
ongoing public debate about a new wave of 
nuclear plants hampers attempts to mitigate 
the shrinking of the capacity margin.
Whilst participation in global gas markets 
helps security of supply, increasing 
dependence on imported gas exposes the 
UK to global price volatility as North Sea 
reserves continue to decline. As prices creep 
continually upwards mechanisms such as 
the feed-in tariff drive modest but steady 
growth in small-scale and domestic renewable 
generation. Signs of reduced reliability and 
the possibility of power outages also lead to 
growing interest in off-grid technologies. The 
‘doom and gloom’ stories remain a favourite 
topic for the media, with evidence emerging 
that this is influencing public attitudes, 
encouraging energy saving and efficiency. 
Demand Side
The national smart meter and accompanying 
communications infrastructures are 
successfully rolled out by 2020 and the billing 
accuracy achieved by automated meter 
reading is readily welcomed by householders, 
resulting in increasing awareness of 
consumption levels and a growing interest 
in efficient appliances. Many householders 
use their in-home display regularly; some 
begin to take an interest in cost savings and 
a market for in-home displays with greater 
functionality emerges. Concurrently with the 
meter installations there is a slow but steady 
rise in the number of heat pumps, boosted 
by the Renewable Heat Inventive. They are 
mostly taken up in areas off the gas grid, gas 
remaining the most cost-effective method of 
space and water heating.
Networks
The modest rise in small-scale and 
community renewables means that DNOs 
start to consider the technical and cost 
implications of accommodating reverse 
power flows. A greater amount of investment 
is allowed under RIIO-ED1 such that DNOs 
begin to channel investment into innovative 
solutions rather than conventional fixes. 
However, as growth of power-hungry 
technologies (such as EVs and heat pumps) is 
slow, advanced instrumentation is only being 
installed in the distribution networks on the 
basis of need and cost-effectiveness. Upgrades 
to increase the smartness of the network 
are restricted to areas with higher expected 
rises in peak demand and more complex load 
profiles – the latter often due to clusters of 
microgeneration typically occurring in rural 
areas.
2020 - 2030
Supply Side
Wind capacity reaches 20GW in the mid-2020s 
when several large offshore installations are 
completed. The Renewable Heat Inventive 
stimulates supply chains, skills and business 
models, improving the economics of CHP 
generation significantly. Additionally, the 
government grants local authorities greater 
control over energy issues, including power to 
ensure that benefits from renewables projects 
flow into nearby communities. A number of 
enterprising authorities start partnerships 
with businesses to operate CHP units, often 
using local biomass or biogas. District heating 
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develops in suitable areas including new-build 
flats, tower blocks and warehouses with a high 
heat demand. Large-scale social landlords play 
an important role in driving energy-efficient 
new-build programmes, PV installation and 
whole-block renewable heating systems.
Energy storage regulations are clarified 
alongside RIIO-ED2 in the early-to-mid 20s. As 
the decade continues, some storage devices 
are put in place for network management, 
but only in situations where the high costs 
can be recouped and/or where it provides a 
vital balancing function in the transmission 
network. Growth in wind and PV across Europe 
drives greater levels of interconnection, 
providing an important source of supply side 
flexibility.
Demand Side
Householders’ understanding of their 
electricity consumption improves, and 
prompts greater interest in efficiency 
measures and heat pumps. Take-
up of alternative tariff types grows, 
particularly among households possessing 
microgeneration and heat pumps. Residential 
aggregators emerge in such areas but in the 
absence of significant demand shifting, they 
do not play a major role.
Aggregators deal with both the domestic 
sector and commercial sectors trade on the 
secondary market; with generators looking 
to hedge risk relating to non-appearance 
penalties. Residential DSR is developing, 
but is in its infancy. Businesses consumers, 
particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises, enthusiastically adopt advanced 
metering and sub-metering, flexible contracts, 
new tariff structures, and efficiency measures. 
Nationally, disaggregated data from smart 
meters is still not available to DNOs but as 
householders and businesses directly engaged 
with service providers receive benefits with no 
breaches to privacy being reported, trust in the 
use of data grows.
Local authority-run schemes that reinvest 
revenue from renewables projects in 
household efficiency measures are popular 
when well run. Clear communication of 
how they operate and transparent evidence 
that revenue is being reinvested effectively 
contributes to public acceptance of such 
ventures. The resulting awareness in energy 
and environmental issues helps to link the 
role of renewables in the generation profile, at 
both local and national levels, with personal 
energy use. The spread of these schemes is 
patchy and uncoordinated in both urban 
and rural areas. Some urban areas find the 
logistics too extensive to overcome; in others 
community groups have reached critical mass 
for efficiency and microgeneration projects to 
take hold successfully. Large concentrations 
of demand coupled with stronger and more 
effective governance capabilities result in 
economies of scale and greater returns to 
investment.
Networks
The clustering of heat pumps and 
microgeneration, and some of the local 
authority-led schemes cause localised 
network congestion. DNOs handle this by 
applying a range of smart technologies 
that enable aspects of active distribution 
network management. Some community 
schemes use small-scale storage technologies 
to balance their demand and generation 
profiles. Experience of being less reliant on 
grid electricity spreads and appeals to more 
communities. Some local authorities start to 
operate private wire networks, only using the 
grid for backup, but cost prevents this from 
becoming widespread.
Towards the end of the decade, regulatory 
reform allows the most advanced DNOs to 
take on more system management. They 
begin the transition to DSOs in those areas 
where ‘smartness’ has clustered. Technologies 
enabling voltage profile management, 
remote switching and demand management 
are introduced to manage power flows on 
critical circuits as an alternative to increasing 
network capacity. DSOs and newer market 
entrants also provide some ancillary services 
to the Transmission System Operator (TSO), 
replacing services previously supplied 
by transmission-connected conventional 
generation. Work begins on the trialling of 
heat storage to reduce and manage loads on 
distribution networks.
36
2030 - 2040
Supply Side
The growing collaboration between local 
authorities, network operators, and businesses 
starts to disrupt the top-down supply-
driven electricity system paradigm. The 
growth in community schemes and onset 
of demand management means that the 
installed capacity of wind reaches 30GW by 
the mid-30s. This growth is split between 
onshore community-owned turbines and 
large offshore installations. Investment in 
interconnection adds flexibility and supports 
a growing European super-grid. The growth 
in the number of households that own and/
or operate microgeneration and small-scale 
storage technologies is significant, particularly 
PV in urban areas.
There remains a substantial amount of 
gas in the UK generation mix, although the 
prospect of mandated use of carbon capture 
technologies causes investment uncertainty 
around the competitiveness of gas against 
renewables. The only nuclear-powered 
generators are the few that remain from the 
largely unsuccessful push for a new fleet that 
occurred in the 2010s.
Demand Side
The economics of EVs have been improving 
and they are now reasonably common in 
urban and suburban neighbourhoods. Whilst 
the grid requires reinforcement in places to 
handle the higher peak flows – particularly 
where clustering of vehicles occurs – networks 
are able to interact with the vehicles in order 
to smooth peaks. Innovative tariffs encourage 
consumers to accept some remote operation 
of vehicle charging. For example, network 
operators may contribute towards the upfront 
costs of the vehicles and guarantee the life 
of the battery in return for some control over 
how they are charged.
The growth of EVs triggers greater demand 
side flexibility and the aggregators that 
emerged in the previous decade now play 
a greater role, offering a range of services 
from instant supplier switching to network 
management and system balancing.
As R&D has improved the performance of air-
source heat pumps, legislation is introduced 
to limit further growth of gas-fired heating 
systems in new housing developments. As 
business consumers see the benefits of time-
of-use and flexible tariffs, some employees 
become interested in their domestic 
application.
Networks
As the 2030s progress, many rural areas 
source the majority of their electricity 
locally and rely less on the grid. DNOs 
regularly install sensors to improve network 
observability, and not just at the extremities 
of their networks.  Most DNOs have some 
control over distributed generators – including 
electrical and heat storage – and so continue 
to develop as DSOs.
This gradual – though partial – reallocation of 
control from the TSO to the DSOs is mirrored 
by a shift in investment: spending to increase 
the capacity of the transmission system 
has been lower than had been anticipated, 
although it still serves large non-domestic 
consumers and towns and cities, and carries 
bulk national and international flows.
2040 – 2050
Supply Side
Centralised generation exists primarily to 
meet the needs of large towns, cities and 
industry: the bulk of which comes either from 
offshore wind or gas generators (some fitted 
with CCS). Strong integration with European 
networks adds flexibility, and smaller-scale 
generation from a wide range of technologies 
has grown and now makes up a significant 
proportion of supply capacity. Owners of 
large amounts of roof space commonly act 
as generators too, and commercial premises 
are able to provide demand side services by 
adjusting their heating and cooling needs, 
aided by a capacity market designed and 
operated in order to draw the maximum 
benefit from demand side measures before 
calling on generation.
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Demand Side
Heat pumps and EVs often coincide in the 
same areas. Improvements in range and 
the national charging infrastructure mean 
EVs are popular across the country, with 
the batteries providing a valuable balancing 
function in areas with large amounts of 
renewables, which has been a major factor in 
the development of DNOs into DSOs. However, 
batteries have still not developed to the point 
where they can be used for dynamic storage 
at scale. The acceptance by consumers of 
time-of-use tariffs and the adoption of energy 
efficiency measures has helped to reduce peak 
demand, although significant demand shifting 
behaviour remains elusive. Although real-
time price signals are available, residential 
consumers remain resistant, and only a small 
number of business customers are taking up 
services based on dynamic pricing.
Networks 
The transmission system provides important 
flexibility at times when DSOs cannot provide 
sufficient DSR and also serves areas that 
cannot balance their own power needs. It 
also carries bulk power from areas rich in 
generation, especially renewable resources. 
The increased quantity of generation in the 
distribution networks has reduced the load 
on the transmission system, and some of the 
skills and knowledge of active transmission 
network management acquired in previous 
decades have been transferred to the DSOs. 
Smartness in the distribution networks is 
patchy, causing some difficulty in urban 
areas where successful community or local 
authority schemes adjoin areas with less 
demand side engagement or where geography 
or property mix prevents the operation of 
cost-effective schemes. Some areas are keen 
to take even greater control by buying back 
their portions of the network, which presents 
complex regulatory and legal issues for 
Parliament and the regulator.
State of the World in 2050
 
This scenario describes a radical move away 
from the historical functioning of the power 
industry and a move towards a much more 
decentralised system in which ‘prosumers’ 
both contribute to and draw from the wider 
networks (Figure 7). A significant amount of 
electricity is generated at a household and 
community level, although large, centralised 
generation still has a role to play in meeting 
demand from urban centres and industry. A 
major driver for this kind of change has been 
consumer engagement, which has created 
demand for new energy services and pushed 
forward the evolution of the system. Network 
operators now play a much more active role in 
the management of their distribution systems.
38
3.3 Smart Power Sector
Defining characteristics:
• Consumers are passive, and largely 
resistant to demand side measures.
• Strong policy-led development of 
renewable energy sources.
• Network operators take the lead with 
innovation as it is necessary to handle 
rises in demand from EV adoption.
• The supply industry deploys smart 
technologies and techniques where a 
business case can be made to avoid 
network reinforcement costs.
• Grid-scale energy storage and international 
connections form an important supply side 
solution.
Now – 2020
Supply Side
Beyond the ongoing closures of large thermal 
plant (due to the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive) and remaining nuclear stations, 
there are no radical changes in the generation 
profile. Offshore wind generation grows in 
line with supply chain constraints and the 
availability of grid connections but well-
organised campaigns prevent significant 
further onshore development. The government 
pushes ahead with plans to develop a new 
nuclear fleet to replace forthcoming closures, 
and a small number of new reactors are under 
construction by 2020.
Demand Side
Although energy suppliers successfully install 
smart meters in all residential and small-to-
medium sized commercial properties by 2020, 
trust in the companies remains low as prices 
continue to rise. Optimism about the possible 
household savings soon wears off as negative 
stories about potential, suspected or actual 
privacy breaches emerge. The commercial 
sector is generally more accepting of the 
meters than the domestic sector. In addition to 
global gas markets, the policy support offered 
Figure 7. Groundswell Scenario
to conventional and renewable generation 
also inflates prices. Residential demand grows 
slowly with new sources of demand, such 
as EVs and heat pumps, remaining small in 
number and geographically dispersed. Small-
scale PV installations have grown only very 
slowly as the feed-in tariff has been gradually 
reduced.
Networks
Emerging from successful Low Carbon 
Networks Fund and Network Innovation 
Competition projects, DNOs put in place 
selective monitoring and control equipment 
to assist with day-to-day management and 
planning. However, this is only progressing 
at the rate of their asset replacement 
programmes. A basic communication 
infrastructure is developed alongside the 
national smart meter rollout. The Data and 
Communications Company and Data Services 
Providers start to operate, but they only 
pass historical aggregated data to the DNOs, 
which have limited usefulness for network 
management.
2020 – 2030
Supply Side
By the middle of the decade wind capacity 
reaches 20GW, mostly due to ongoing 
policy support and accumulated offshore 
engineering expertise. Since the government 
gave communities a greater say in planning 
decisions, developers have largely abandoned 
trying to site onshore wind turbines. Further 
investment in renewables in encouraged by 
strong policy signals and government support 
– principally in the form of the EU Emissions 
Trading System, underpinned by the UK 
carbon floor price.
Gas generators still provide system flexibility, 
although wind generation capacity rises at 
a considerable rate and the TSO becomes 
concerned about managing periods of low 
demand and high generation; there is not 
always a ready export market or sufficient 
interconnector capacity. The fear is that prices 
may fall, adversely affecting investment in the 
industry. Regulatory reform resolves issues 
of DNOs owning and operating storage, and 
European targets for renewables, efficiency 
and emissions tighten. These provide impetus 
for R&D into system balancing and grid-scale 
storage technologies, paving the way for 
commercial development and new market 
entrants. Towards 2030 significant advances 
are made in energy storage technologies.
Demand Side
Residential consumers remain largely 
disengaged, and very little progress has been 
made regarding efficiency, load-shifting or 
demand reduction. As energy bills remain 
high, power companies remain a popular 
target for tabloid newspapers. The Green Deal, 
launched a decade earlier, received such little 
interest that the government quietly drops 
the idea of a replacement scheme. As it is 
apparent that residential load shifting on a 
large scale is unfeasible, legislation mandating 
many types of white goods to be responsive to 
abnormal voltage and frequency is enacted. 
However, some efficiency improvements 
are made where energy management is the 
responsibility of the landlord rather than 
the tenant, especially with social housing 
providers and commercial users. 
Towards the end of the decade, EVs numbers 
increase as sustained policy and private sector 
momentum results in a growing charging 
infrastructure. Businesses form partnerships 
with public and private organisations to 
provide services to EV owners and car clubs. 
Many towns and cities have numerous 
charging points, and the highest rates of 
EV growth are found in affluent suburban 
neighbourhoods. 
Networks
Surveys show consistently that consumers 
are unwilling to allow any further access to, 
or use of, the data that smart meters record. 
Although the aggregated historical data 
does help DNOs to plan investments and 
maintenance schedules, it does not assist real-
time operation. The parts of the network with 
highest EV penetration almost require active 
management and the lack of observability 
has become an issue. If the present rate of 
EV growth continues, the business case for 
widespread monitoring equipment at low 
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voltage substations will soon become realistic. 
As it seems that the existing smart meter 
infrastructure will be available to them, 
DNOs start to consider the value of creating 
dedicated metering and communications 
systems.
2030 – 2040
Supply Side
By the early 2030s, a number of new 
nuclear power stations contribute around 
10% of the generation capacity. This helps 
to accommodate the growing use of EVs, 
improving diversity of supply, and moves the 
UK towards emissions reduction targets. By 
the mid-2030s there is around 30GW of wind 
capacity, although this is increasingly difficult 
to integrate due to the near-total absence 
of DSR. The construction of a multinational 
North Sea HVDC grid is expected to alleviate 
this to some extent.
Towards the end of the decade, power 
stations built during the second ‘dash for 
gas’ begin to face closure; those with lifetime 
extensions continue to operate but are subject 
to increasingly stringent environmental 
regulation. The flexibility provided by gas 
generation becomes increasingly valuable to 
the system, and many are granted extensions 
on this basis. Investment in R&D a decade ago 
has produced a small but growing number of 
grid-scale storage devices, a development that 
assures the investment community that the 
risks of constraining the growth of renewables 
can be mitigated.
Demand Side
The number of EVs rises quickly as higher 
sales in other countries brings down the 
relative price of the vehicles. This increases 
the size of evening peaks, which prove to 
be difficult to shift due to the very low 
levels of consumer engagement. Although 
vehicles are fitted with software that can 
take account of the network’s frequency and 
voltage conditions, or even communicate 
automatically with the network operator, most 
owners over-ride these features. There is only 
a limited response to time-of-use pricing, as 
the incentives remain insufficient to change 
consumer behaviour. Lengthy studies reveal 
that consumer inertia and the ‘hassle factor’ 
are greater barriers to tariff switching and 
home improvements than previously thought. 
It becomes evident that only the house-
by-house, street-by-street, refurbishment 
programmes carried out in some low-
population Scandinavian countries would be 
successful at significantly reducing domestic 
energy consumption.
Networks
Increasingly sophisticated demand modelling 
using better quality historical power use 
data assists with network planning and asset 
management, ICT and HPC tools advance 
the point at which DNOs are now using 
near-to-real-time distribution system state 
estimation as a regular network management 
tool. The strong emergence of EVs creates 
significant challenges for DNOs, which in 
some cases is addressed by simply upgrading 
low voltage network capacity. In other areas, 
including some new-build housing estates, 
there is a business case for putting in place 
smart technologies from the outset. Other 
interventions by DNOs include improved 
monitoring and switching for network 
reconfiguration and increased types and levels 
of automation as networks edge towards 
active management. The improved network 
visibility assists with condition monitoring, 
asset management and planning.
2040 – 2050
Supply Side
The generation mix in the 2040s is 
characterised by a high level of renewables 
– predominantly large-scale offshore wind 
developments. Nuclear provides baseload 
generation, and by 2050 all of the country’s 
unabated gas-fired power stations are 
expected to cease operation in order for the 
country’s emissions targets to be met. With a 
rigid demand side there is a heavy reliance on 
storage and interconnection to provide supply 
side flexibility. A strongly integrated European 
electricity market and European super-grid 
bolster supply security across Europe, so less 
emphasis is placed on national security of 
supply.
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Demand Side
Suppliers are considering the merits of the 
next generation of smart meters. However, 
given ongoing concerns about data privacy 
and public attitudes towards power 
companies, there is virtually no prospect 
of upgrading the original rollout. Various 
attempts have been made to encourage the 
use of smarter meters, but with little success. 
There are now a large number of EVs on 
the roads and a well-developed charging 
infrastructure along motorways, which 
increases baseload demand substantially. With 
little demand side flexibility, the government 
considers legislation to allow more effective 
management of this greatly increased 
demand.
Networks
Active network management is normal at all 
voltage levels and spans of the transmission 
and distribution systems, and there is 
particular focus on parts of the low voltage 
networks, typically where EV clusters appear. 
Dealing with the rising demand from passive 
consumers over the last 40 years has forced 
the industry to create a largely smart grid, 
but with significant patches where simple 
reinforcement was the easiest and cheapest 
solution. The HVDC transmission system 
connecting regional renewable resources such 
as North Sea offshore wind, Spanish solar and 
Norwegian hydro to large centres of demand is 
operating and is expected to expand.
State of the world in 2050
 
Under this scenario government commitment 
to emissions targets leads to significant 
growth in variable output generation (Figure 
8). Consumer antipathy prevents major smart 
developments at household and community 
levels, including DSR and very advanced 
metering and tariffs. However, the growing 
power demand resulting from the steady 
adoption of EVs combined with the amount 
of variable generation results in system 
balancing problems. The value of grid-scale 
storage becomes significant at this point, 
as the system can be managed much more 
effectively if it is developed and applied at 
scale. In the absence of storage, however, the 
difficulty of managing the system leads to a 
branching point: either consumers are offered 
extremely generous incentives in return for 
demand side flexibility or very expensive 
network upgrades are made to accommodate 
the much higher power flows. The roles and 
responsibilities of the DNOs, such as the 
level of active management, depend upon 
which branch is followed. As in the Minimum 
Smart scenario domestic consumers decline 
to become active service providers, and 
there is little in the way of innovative new 
entrants to pull them into changing their 
world perspective. Again there are insufficient 
drivers for significant uptake of DSM.
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3.4 Smart 2050
Defining characteristics:
• Strong and sustained policy commitment 
to renewable energy.
• Capital is available at competitive rates.
Consumers are active and willing to 
engage with energy issues.
• Policy and regulation is supportive of 
low carbon technologies and associated 
infrastructure.
• DNOs invest in and develop widespread 
active network management techniques 
and technologies.
Now – 2020
Supply Side
The contribution of coal to the generation 
profile declines in line with the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive and (later) the 
European Industrial Emissions Directive. 
The amount of nuclear generation also falls 
as ageing plants close. Increasing gas- and 
biomass-fired generation fills the gap left by 
closing coal plant, and although replacement 
programmes for one or two nuclear plants 
are starting, the long-term economic viability 
of nuclear remains unclear. Interconnection 
capacity increases, taking advantage of 
arbitrage opportunities arising from the 
significant and growing wind and PV capacity 
across Europe.
Towards the end of this decade there is 
further and substantial market reform, as 
international developments – especially 
global climate agreements – lead the UK 
to reinforce its commitment to meeting its 
2050 legislation. This leads to stronger policy 
measures in a range of areas including CCS 
and energy storage.
Demand Side
Smart meters are successfully installed with 
a strong and credible public information 
campaign despite some media scare 
stories. A dedicated intermediary Data 
and Communications Company is set up 
Figure 8. Smart Power Sector Scenario
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smoothly and the new company manages 
the flows of data effectively and securely. 
Various smart phone apps start to appear with 
particularly well-designed ones attracting 
significant numbers of users. This results in an 
underestimation of the impact of meters and 
in-home displays. The benefits of installing 
the meters become tangible to consumers as 
they begin to understand how their energy 
use fluctuates throughout the day and across 
the seasons. As the use of in-home displays is 
coupled with phone apps, many consumers 
focus on the potential for cost savings rather 
than the privacy risks.
Some larger city-based EV trials (UK and 
abroad) begin to allay range anxiety and 
have a marked positive impact on the 
general perception of the vehicles. This 
spurs new investment in R&D to improve 
battery performance, and there is optimism 
that this will allow economies of scale to 
take hold, improving EVs’ competitiveness 
against conventional vehicles. Although the 
government continues to offer subsidies for 
the cars, in the absence of a national strategy 
for infrastructure development the new cars 
are small in number and confined to mostly 
urban areas.
Networks
A clear long-term vision from Ofgem 
encourages TSOs and DNOs to innovate and 
allows consideration of long-term investment 
that extends into the RIIO-T2 and RIIO-ED2 
periods. The Network Innovation Competition 
proves effective at incentivising innovation 
in the transmission networks. Through 
RIIO, regulation begins to be effective in 
encouraging DNOs to innovate and adopt 
alternatives to traditional investment where 
financially viable.  This helps to increase the 
capacity of existing network assets and to 
reduce the investment burden.
2020 – 2030
Supply Side
Despite missing the 2020 EU renewables 
targets, growth in both onshore and offshore 
wind means that they are reached not long 
into the decade.
Clear and effective policy and improved grid-
access arrangements causes the proportion 
of variable supply to rise to 30GW by the 
middle of the decade. Much of this growth 
is in offshore wind, but biomass makes 
a significant contribution and early tidal 
stream schemes start to operate. Despite 
various technical and financial difficulties, a 
small number of new nuclear plants start to 
generate towards the end of the decade.
Innovation in interruptible contracts 
allows smaller consumers with non-
essential shiftable power demand – such 
as industrial refrigeration, heat storage and 
some types of machinery – to offer demand 
side services. Whilst this provides a small 
amount of demand side flexibility, the much 
more substantial benefits from DSM in the 
residential sector are yet to be exploited. A 
substantial round of market reform passes in 
the late 2020s designed to boost competition 
and stimulate the provision of new and 
conventional services. Legislation passes that 
guarantees storage reliable access to market 
(within the constraints of network balancing), 
controls how and by what means networks 
and aggregators are able to exercise demand 
side control measures over appliances in 
customers’ homes, and redefines the roles and 
responsibilities of DNOs, allowing them to own 
and/or operate generation and storage.
Demand Side
Greater pricing and costing transparency, 
growing energy awareness, and a long-term 
trend of rising energy bills leads householders 
to take a more active interest in reducing 
their energy consumption. This level of 
interest grows slowly through the first half 
of the 2020s led by younger more tech-aware 
urbanites whose salaries are stretched by 
housing costs. This results in modest but 
sustained behavioural changes, and a desire 
for a wider variety of tariffs to suit their 
needs. The real-time pricing information now 
available makes customer communication 
and pricing much simpler and somewhat 
improves the perception of power companies 
in the mind of the public.
Throughout the 2020s and beyond, the 
capabilities of in-home displays improve. As 
consumer interest grows, a market for devices 
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with greater functionality than the basic ones 
issued at rollout develops. These in-home 
displays are able to interact with household 
appliances and manufacturers of white goods 
increasingly supply inter-operable products. 
A burgeoning aggregation industry maximises 
the value of DSR for commercial customers 
for both energy balancing and network 
management purposes.
Networks
Ongoing installation of monitoring equipment 
at substations means that DNOs develop 
better observability within their networks and 
are able to focus investment on those parts 
under greatest stress. This is a direct result of 
the regulatory changes made as part of RIIO-
ED1, which enables DNOs to justify ‘forward 
investment’ in enabling technologies that 
help avoid expensive conventional capital 
expenditure on network reinforcement. 
Successful trial schemes to embed intelligence 
and automation in the networks are extended 
as experience spreads enabling DNOs to 
begin actively managing some areas where 
EV penetration is growing. This is aided by 
clarification from the regulator regarding the 
roles and responsibilities of both the TSO and 
DNOs. Consideration is given to potential 
conflicts that may arise from DNOs managing 
their own networks and the TSO managing the 
national system.
The rising price of heating fuels (in 
combination with incentive from the 
Renewable Heat Inventive) triggers many 
consumers off the gas grid to install ground- 
and air-source heat pumps to meet their 
heating needs. By the mid-to-late 2020s this 
leads to congestion on some local distribution 
networks as systems are frequently clustered 
in areas and installed at similar times.
2030 – 2040
Supply Side
By the start of the 2030s sustained policy 
support has led to the construction of several 
coal-fired power station fitted with CCS. 
The small number of nuclear stations also 
contributes to meeting baseload demand. 
Even though the TSO and DNOs are gaining 
experience and confidence operating with 
less baseload power, gas-fired generation is 
still used at times of peak demand. However, 
legislation requiring that gas be fitted with 
CCS, and the consequent loss of flexibility, is 
adding impetus to the efforts to scale up the 
role of electrical storage.
Throughout the 2030s renewables and 
interconnection capacity grow, with 
connections to Ireland and Norway providing 
the UK with an important flexible resource 
that helps counter the less-predictable output 
from the large amount of offshore wind now 
contributing to the system. Construction of a 
European super-grid offers further potential 
for the accommodation of renewables in the 
UK system.
Demand Side
By the early 2030s, the majority of households 
have one of a range of more advanced in-
home displays. Whilst the complexity of these 
varies, most are able to handle much more 
rapid forms of two-way communication with 
the customer via mobile phone apps. Growing 
participation in aggregation services results 
in lower household energy prices. A modest 
proportion of householders take advantage 
of dynamic and critical peak pricing tariffs, 
and new market entrants provide a range 
of energy services to consumers (as well as 
to network operators). These include the 
provision of heating and lighting by energy 
service companies rather than conventional 
per-unit energy sales. New entrants are able 
to team up with aggregators and network 
operators in order to offer consumers new 
ways of managing their energy use, allowing 
them greater control and opening up further 
potential for DSR.
The introduction of EU-wide EV charging 
infrastructure legislation a decade earlier 
has stimulated the number of EVs on the 
roads and changes the economics relative to 
conventional vehicles. This results in greater 
power demand in some areas, which causes 
stress on parts of the distribution network, 
particularly where air-source heat pumps 
– increasingly competitive with gas-fired 
central heating – become more common. This 
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stimulates the development of DSM devices 
and tariffs to ensure that EVs do not draw 
charge during peak hours. Later in the decade, 
trials show that EV users can benefit from 
quasi-dynamic tariffs.
Networks
Monitoring and automation equipment is 
now widespread across the MV network, with 
patches of smart technologies in selected 
substations in the low voltage networks. 
To improve active management in these 
networks, DNOs look to introduce some 
control over the demand profile to reduce 
congestion where EVs are clustering. Through 
collaboration with aggregators, by the mid-
2030s they are able to shift some residential 
load at times of peak demand. Under 
specifically defined conditions to ensure stable 
network operation, DNOs are being allowed 
access to short periods of detailed near-to-
real-time data. This remains patchy as the 
smart meter communications networks are 
still developing beyond the basic original 
installation.
2040 – 2050
Supply Side
The power generation system is now able to 
rely on a wider range of sources: offshore and 
onshore wind, gas, nuclear, tidal stream, PV, 
some biomass and small amounts of wave 
power. Grid-scale storage plays an important 
balancing role with several technologies 
with different operational characteristics. 
Gas-fired stations still play a significant role, 
although their flexibility is constrained by 
CCS technologies. The global development of 
demand side technologies and techniques, 
in tandem with high fossil fuel prices, means 
that DSM is often more cost-effective than 
peaking plant. The nuclear stations built in the 
2020s provide baseload generation pressure to 
start planning for their replacements begins to 
build.
Demand Side
People who grew up with in-home displays 
controllable via phone apps are energy 
literate and start families of their own. For 
a significant and growing proportion of the 
population, energy conservation is a normal 
activity and an important consideration 
when buying a house. Low efficiency homes 
with higher levels of energy consumption 
are unpopular and clearly discounted in the 
housing market because costs of heating and/
or insulating them to a decent standard.
EVs are prevalent and the tendency for them 
to cluster requires that owners take part in 
DSM as part of the ownership package. For 
some DNOs this includes the use of specially-
designed time-of-use tariffs and critical peak 
pricing.
Networks
Although construction of a European 
transmission network and a North Sea 
offshore grid are not yet finished, the parts 
completed add a robustness that TSOs and 
DNOs can exploit at a subnational level. Cost-
competitive storage technologies assist with 
the active management of networks where 
EVs, heat pumps and PV are commonplace.
Homes, particularly those that have electric 
heating or own an EV, can interact with the 
local network via their phone or computer in 
order to choose how and when the DNO or a 
third party can enact demand side measures. 
Consumers are accustomed to communicating 
with the network operator as well as their 
supplier – indeed, in some cases these two 
roles have merged, with single companies 
providing both services. Despite the well-
developed demand control abilities of network 
operators there has been an ongoing need to 
make very significant network upgrades in 
areas where demand has risen.
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State of the world in 2050
 
This scenario can be seen as one in which 
many drivers come together to lead to a future 
in which 2050 emissions and renewables 
targets are met through a combination of 
top-down policy interventions and public 
willingness to engage (Figure 9). There is a 
general consensus around the need for action 
to tackle climate change and an acceptance 
that it will be funded largely through energy 
bills. Consumer engagement makes possible 
demand side measures that allow large 
amounts of renewables to be accommodated 
into the generation profile, although there 
is still a large role for baseload generation. 
Network operators play a much more 
active role in system balancing and whilst 
it was initially possible to delay significant 
network reinforcement with the application 
of smart technologies, ultimately the 
ongoing electrification of heat and transport 
has meant that substantial conventional 
investment has been necessary.
3.5 Comparison of scenarios
Table 3, below, provides a brief overview of 
the differences in the main characteristics of 
each of four scenarios. The number of bullets 
conveys the comparative extent to which  
notable possible characteristics of the UK’s 
future energy system is apparent in each 
scenario. A brief glance will show, for example, 
that the role of residential consumers in 
the Smart Power Sector scenario is minimal 
compared to its role in the Groundswell 
scenario. The list of characteristics is not 
exhaustive.
Figure 9. Smart 2050 Scenario
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Table 3. Comparison of scenarios
Function Minimum 
Smart Groundswell
Smart Power 
Sector Smart 2050
UK policy commitment • • • • • • • • • • • • •
EU policy strength • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Supply
Large-scale renewables • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Decentralised renewables • • • • • • • • • •
Nuclear • • • • • • • • • • • •
Unabated gas • • • • • • • • •
Carbon capture and storage • • • • • • • • •
Grid-scale storage • • • • • • • • • • •
Interconnection • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Demand
Tariff complexity • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Advanced smart metering • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Electrification of heat • • • • • • • • • • • 
Electrification of transport • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Industrial and commercial DSR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Residential DSR • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Networks
Advanced monitoring and 
controls
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
DNO’s consumer data access • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Active network management • • • • • • • • • • • • •
DNO’s own and/or operate 
generation
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
Smart Grid Services Enabled
Balance a large amount of 
renewables ü ü ü
Greater observability and 
controllability of the grid ü ü ü ü
Enable deployment of DSR 
technologies ü ü
Active network management ü
Integration of active loads 
(heat pumps & EV’s) ü ü ü
Allow integration of energy 
storage ü ü
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3.6 Switching between 
pathways
One of the benefits of the FAR methodology 
is the possibility for switching between the 
different scenarios, which can be seen Figure 
5. As the pathways begin to take shape as 
part of the FAR process, it becomes clear 
that there are points at which the routes 
can diverge, converge or ‘jump’ from one to 
another. Merging points are less common 
than branching points and tend to occur 
less far into the future, thus demonstrating 
alternative routes towards a given endpoint, 
whereas branching points can be seen as 
points in time where critical events occur that 
will shape the future (often, but not always, 
through an active decision-making process).
In addition to merging and branching, there 
are points at which a given pathways can 
‘switch’ from one to another. The Faustian 
Tree developed as part of the FAR process 
present a number of points where it is possible 
to switch between pathways. Clearly, looking 
at the diagram, there are a number of places 
where the pathways overlap. We focus on and 
expand two of these below.
Switching away from smart power sector
Smart Power Sector progresses to a point 
where it is essentially forced to switch into 
another scenario due to active resistance 
from the public in the form of a refusal to 
participate in any demand side measures 
whatsoever. The way in which such an 
obstacle is tackled constitutes the branching 
point; in this case, how demand side 
inflexibility is addressed dictates whether 
the scenario switches to Minimum Smart or 
Smart 2050 (see below, The Consequences 
of Switching Pathways). If economic signals 
are increased to such an extent that DSR is 
initiated (or it is perhaps mandated), then 
this improves demand side flexibility and 
allows further renewables development 
(potentially at high cost). Such an approach 
may be economically and/or political 
undesirable and supply side flexibility may 
be the preferred option, owing either to cost 
or political expediency. In this instance the 
pathway would switch to Minimum Smart, 
and a system characterised, presumably, by a 
relatively larger proportion of gas generation.
Branching point: policy decisions
Box G in the Faustian Tree represents a point 
in future where the effects of the smart meter 
rollout on consumer engagement are being 
felt, and where a significant policy decision 
concerning generation is taken. Such a 
decision is very likely to be influenced by a 
wide array of factors, including international 
climate negotiations and global energy 
markets. A strong policy decision in favour 
of renewable generation sends the scenario 
down a very different pathway – one requiring 
a much higher level of consumer engagement 
– than a policy decision that favours gas, 
which may be a consequence of global 
shale exploitation and falling gas prices, for 
example. This branching point is the first point 
at which the Smart 2050 and Smart Power 
Sector scenarios diverge.
The consequences of switching pathways
Switching between pathways should be 
interpreted as moving from one scenario 
to another that is broadly similar to the 
destination scenario and not necessarily 
identical. It is also important to note that 
switching from one pathway to another may 
well involve going effectively ‘back in time’, 
similar in nature as the decision-making and 
investment times involved would mean the 
destination pathway would be less developed 
than if it had been followed from the 
beginning. Switching can therefore be costly 
in terms of time and resources and is likely 
to have a significant impact on all factors – 
consumers, markets, networks, generation etc. 
Whilst in most cases it will be a setback, it can 
also be seen as an opportunity to move from a 
pathway where environmental objectives are 
unlikely to be met to one in which they are 
within reach, although more expensively and 
later than might otherwise have been the case.
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3.7 Wildcards
We have located ‘wildcards’ throughout 
the scenarios. These are events that would 
represent a shock of some kind to the energy 
system and would necessitate some form of 
response. Although several of these wildcards 
could fit into any scenario, we have generally 
located them where they are either most likely 
to occur or have the most intuitive ‘fit’, or 
where their occurrence would be likely to have 
the most significant impact – perhaps leading 
to a switch from one scenario to another 
(Table 4).
For example in the case of the Major Nuclear 
Incident wildcard, a rapid phase-out of 
nuclear generation under the Smart Power 
Sector scenario might result in either a sudden 
‘switching on’ of consumer engagement as 
the public is prepared to accept voluntary 
or enforced behavioural change (which is 
not without precedent – e.g. as seen in Japan 
following the nuclear incidents in 2011), or the 
complete absence of such public willingness 
may lead to the hurried construction of a large 
amount of gas generation. In this situation, 
therefore, the pathway may switch either to 
the Smart 2050 or to the Minimum Smart 
scenario respectively. We highlight that such 
events often result in change that represents 
a radical departure from the status quo – 
something which many scenarios project do 
not attempt to address but are nevertheless 
important to consider.
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Table 4. The effect of wildcards on scenarios
Re-nationalisation: Smart Power Sector
Public anger towards power companies reaches such a pitch that the industry is 
renationalised wholesale and paid for in part through general taxation. Costs go up as 
inefficiencies creep in but there is a much greater level of support for decarbonisation.
Break-up of utilities: Minimum Smart
Legislation limits the size of power companies, which then find it difficult to secure 
funding for large renewable projects. Finance is more accessible for thermal plant, so 
decarbonisation falters. Consumer prices fall, however.
Nuclear fusion breakthrough: Minimum Smart
With less need for DSM, the current peaks in demand are amplified by the adoption of 
electric heating and transportation. Very significant upgrading of low voltage networks is 
required in order to handle this growth in demand.
Getting rid of charging codes: Smart 2050 and Smart Power Sector
Action is taken to modify the charging methodologies and associated codes as they apply 
to DNOs, such that charges for load and generation (including storage) connected to 
the network are amended and that changes outside specified limits in either category 
have to be communicated to the DNO. This allows DNOs to have greater knowledge 
of installations across their networks and helps to reduce, for example, the impact of 
clustering of EVs and heat pumps. This could apply more strictly to the industrial and 
commercial sectors as desired and as appropriate to the scenario.
Cyber-security disaster: All Scenarios
The hacking of smart meters on a large scale demonstrates the inherent vulnerabilities 
of the system. Customers become very reluctant to share any data beyond a basic meter 
reading on a monthly basis, making it much more difficult for DNOs to plan future 
investments. Conventional reinforcements favoured over smart technologies.
Reports of smart meters catching fire (for example): Smart 2050
Negative press coverage of the dangers of smart meters, even though there is little 
evidence of this, leads to widespread public resistance, making much needed DSM much 
more difficult to implement.
Another major nuclear accident: Smart Power Sector
A major nuclear incident results in huge loss of public confidence and a political 
decision to phase out nuclear generation rapidly, resulting in a shift to renewables. The 
public is much more accepting of the necessary demand side measures and distributed 
renewables receive a major boost. Networks are required to act rapidly to accommodate 
the change in supply profile. Shift to Smart 2050.
Alternatively, consumer intransigence results in a shift to gas generation as it becomes 
clear than demand side measures will be impossible to implement. Shift to Minimum 
Smart.
Growth of energy co-operatives (similar to Germany): Smart 2050
The emergence of the type of energy co-operative seen in Germany, in which 
communities retain (majority) ownership, reduces the dominance of large industry 
players. DNOs need to respond to the rapidly growing amount of distributed generation 
in the networks. Shift to Groundswell.
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Table 4 cont. The effect of wildcards on scenarios
Emergence of a European regulator: Smart 2050
Increasing energy market integration, regulatory co-operation between member states, 
and pressure to minimise the cost to the consumer of large-scale renewables leads to the 
emergence of a body of EU regulation and ultimately to an EU-level regulator. This body 
takes on increased responsibility over time, with Ofgem moving from the responsible 
body to a facilitating body.
The move is driven by the European Commission to secure reduced costs in meeting 
EU wide renewable energy targets via closer integration. There are various possible 
actions, representing different levels of integration. These include integrated forecasting 
of renewable energy and more strategic interconnection and infrastructure planning. It 
might also act as a driver for integrated innovation projects relating to smarter energy 
delivery.
Scottish Independence: All Scenarios
The impacts of Scottish independence are unknown to a significant degree. 
Independence would leave Scotland with more generation capacity than it requires as 
well as a large fraction of wind, wave and tidal energy potential.
The nations may develop divergent regulatory framework but there is a significant 
chance that a single market might be maintained across the current GB territory. 
Some Scottish political actors have expressed a desire for this but this may not be 
advantageous to all parties. Scottish generators would have little option other than to 
sell via the England interconnectors which may have impacts on price. 
Both Scotland and the reduced UK may have to renegotiate renewable energy targets 
with the EU and this might be complicated by the EU’s position on Scotland becoming 
an independent member state. Given the reduced UK’s lessened potential for renewable 
generation it may no longer need to import as much from Scotland as is currently the 
case. This might have implications for how much smart technology is needed to facilitate 
intermittent generation and where the costs of facilitation would be met.
Climate Impacts: Groundswell and Smart 2050
As summers become hotter reverse-cycle heat pumps become a more attractive 
investment for many residential and commercial premises. While this drives up demand 
over the summer (and reduces network capacity) it also increases the potential for DSM.
Social and Spatial 
Implications
4
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This chapter introduces the findings from a 
number of public workshops, and examines 
the social and spatial implications of our 
scenarios.
4.1 Public Acceptability
Participants in the four public workshops 
reflected a range of geographic, demographic 
and educational backgrounds, as well as home 
types and smart grid-relevant experience. This 
section summarises the main findings from 
(a) the questionnaires and (b) the qualitative 
analysis of the workshop discussions, on 
smart grid experience, knowledge and 
attitudes and responses to the draft scenarios.
Prior experience and knowledge of smart 
grids
In respect of relevant experience, around 
half (53%) owned timed appliances, most 
commonly central heating or washing 
machines, although only 11% were on an 
Economy-7 electricity tariff. Most said they 
were very (26%) or quite (57%) satisfied with 
the way they receive their electricity bills, 
but knowledge of the electricity system and 
of smart grids was relatively low, (see Figure 
10) – although higher for rural (mean 2.6) than 
urban respondents (1.8). Nevertheless, there 
was interest in all smart grid-related topics, 
notably saving energy (Table 5).
Informed opinion about smart grids
Following the workshop, participants’ 
informed opinions on smart grids were 
elicited through questionnaires. Attitudes 
can be characterised as ambivalent (Figure 
11); that is, smart grids are thought to afford 
both benefits and risks. It is noteworthy that 
the balance of benefits to risks is greatest for 
power companies, whilst somewhat higher 
risks are believed to befall consumers.
Questionnaires also asked about the nature 
of the risks and benefits perceived for 
consumers, private companies, and society 
in relation to smart grids. The most common 
types of consumer benefit cited were lower 
energy bills and lowering energy use generally. 
Benefits cited for private companies were 
more varied but also included financial 
benefits, improved efficiency and system 
performance. In terms of societal benefits, 
Figure 10. Self-reported knowledge of electricity system and smart grids across participant 
groups (pre-workshop)
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environmental benefits (e.g. reduced 
emissions) were most commonly cited, 
followed by improved public awareness, 
reduced bills and fewer blackouts.
Consumer risks cited were dominated by 
privacy concerns, though costs, reliability 
and control issues were also mentioned. 
Respondents were less certain about risks to 
power companies or societal risks. Of those 
mentioned for companies, financial risks 
were most prevalent while excessive control 
by power companies was cited by several 
participants, with respect to broader societal 
risks.
Responses to scenarios
In order to engage workshop participants 
with the four scenarios, narrative storylines 
illustrating an individual’s day-to-day life 
in the case of each scenario were created 
and presented to participantsv. Workshop 
participants tended to view the Minimum 
Smart scenario as bleak, partly because 
it involved people having to monitor their 
energy use very closely, and partly because it 
was anticipated that technology would have 
developed far more by 2050. However, it was 
viewed as realistic in the sense that energy 
bills were continuing to rise:
‘Well it’s just like they’re not really enjoying 
life. They’re constantly concerned about cutting 
their energy bills down; fair enough but they’re 
not really enjoying their life at home.’ 
(R4, Rural A)
The idea of having to pay more attention to 
energy use was perceived as an extra pressure 
in already difficult and time-pressed lives. 
Despite this resistance to monitoring, smart 
meters tended to be viewed more positively, 
as a way to help consumers save money and 
cut consumption. Some did question why they 
were being introduced, as it was perceived that 
helping to reduce customer bills was not in 
the interest of power companies. In addition, 
it was assumed that smart meters would 
need to consume energy themselves in order 
to function. There was also speculation that 
smart metering would lead to family members 
obsessively monitoring consumption, causing 
tension in households. Overall, consumers 
would need to be convinced of a clear benefit 
in order to guarantee widespread adoption of 
smart meters.
Table 5. Interest in smart grid related topics (pre-workshop)
Mean SD
Receiving lower energy bills 4.6 0.7
Lowering my energy use 4.5 0.9
Owning more energy efficient appliances 4.4 0.7
Lowering our emissions 4.3 0.7
Being able to monitor energy use at room/appliance level 4.3 0.9
Using new technologies to reduce fuel dependency 4.2 0.9
Becoming less reliant on fossil fuels 4.1 0.9
Sourcing more energy from renewable resources 4.1 1.3
Producing energy at community level 3.9 1.1
Producing my own energy 3.8 0.9
* 5-point scale: 1 = Not at all Interested; 5 = Extremely Interested
v Note that draft, rather than final, scenarios were presented at the public workshops and that revisions to the scenarios 
were made following a project advisory group meeting. In particular, an earlier scenario referred to as ‘Partially Smart’ 
was modified to ’Groundswell’ by highlighting and expanding the scope of community energy schemes as the key sce-
nario driver. As these schemes were already included in the draft version, the results remain applicable. The revisions in 
the other scenarios are minimal.
Society
Private companies
Consumers
Risks
Benefits
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Participants were also asked whether 
they would like household appliances 
displaying energy usage. Answers here varied 
considerably. It was thought that having 
displays would increase awareness of usage 
and may be useful for larger appliances such 
as washing machines. Displays were likened 
to having energy efficiency stickers on new 
appliances. There was some resistance to 
replacing old but reliable appliances, with the 
underlying assumption that older appliances 
were better quality. It was often assumed 
that ‘smart’ appliances would be more 
expensive, presenting a very practical barrier 
to ownership:
‘That’s the problem, I worry about the smart 
appliances being out of my reach, my financial 
reach, or I’ll end up getting them on hire 
purchase and paying right through the nose’ 
(R1 Urban A)
The scenario Smart Power Sector was viewed 
as a more positive version of the future when 
compared with the Minimum Smart scenario. 
It was seen as more developed and futuristic, 
and for this reason a more likely portrayal 
of how 2050 might be. However, debate 
concerning the collection of personal data and 
how it might be used dominated discussion. 
Participants questioned how consumers 
would benefit from allowing personal data 
to be collected, whereas it was automatically 
assumed that power companies would reap 
financial rewards from such an exercise:
‘Most people just want to know what they’re 
paying for is efficient and that they’re getting 
good value for money [...] the energy companies 
are making billions out of us, it doesn’t matter 
how energy efficient you are, they’re all 
creaming off and making a fortune’
(R2, Rural B)
Participants also questioned the type of 
data to be collected. Anonymised data to 
establish trends and help smooth running of 
the network was seen as far more acceptable 
than data traceable to people or households. 
When talking about future developments, 
participants were often cynical over the extent 
to which change would be forced upon them, 
and what would be a positive choice actively 
taken. Participants wanted reassurance that 
there would be legislation in place to protect 
their data, prevent identity fraud, and that it 
would be used specifically to improve service 
and infrastructure. The benefits from data 
Figure 11. Perceived risks and benefits associated with smart grids (post-workshop)
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sharing would have to be evident.
The Groundswell scenario was viewed as 
a more realistic representation of 2050 in 
that it seemed sufficiently more advanced 
than either the Minimum Smart or Smart 
Power Sector scenarios. Despite further 
changes made to this scenario following the 
public workshops, the key finding, on the 
acceptability of spatial variation in types 
of technologies and services enabled via 
smart grids, remain largely applicable in this 
community-led future. Participants were 
divided about how positive this version of the 
future was.
In terms of first impressions, groups liked 
the idea of getting a larger proportion of 
energy from renewable sources. Yet when 
introduced to the idea of spatial variation 
in the types of technologies available across 
the UK, participants were fundamentally 
uncomfortable with inequalities in access. The 
urban engaged group speculated that rural 
areas would suffer due to lack of access to 
services, but urban early adopters would pay 
higher prices for technologies that would later 
be rolled out nationally. The rural engaged 
groups held more pragmatic views of urban-
rural differences, drawing parallels with 
existing problems of access to high-speed 
broadband in remote areas. This group also 
suggested that those living in cities may be 
restricted too, for example, using a washing 
machine at off peak times may be limited due 
to potentially disturbing neighbours.
Although spatial variations in access 
concerned participants, they were more 
preoccupied by financial exclusion and the 
possible social repercussions. Participants 
could not see how those on lower incomes 
would be able to afford smart appliances, 
specialist services or an energy-efficient 
home. Participants envisaged energy as an 
increasingly scarce and costly resource: 
the well-off remain unaffected while the 
majority is left to cut back, worsening 
existing social divisions. Given that many 
technologies portrayed also appear to be 
quite advanced compared with those existing 
today, participants also envisaged that older 
generations would struggle to adapt enough 
in order to understand and benefit from 
such developments. Vulnerable people may 
become anxious and be taken advantage of by 
companies, or miss out on potential benefits. 
The introduction of specialist companies 
offering services alongside power companies 
prompted concern over the degree of control 
they would have over consumers and access 
to personal data. Participants were wary of 
energy service firms, and this linked in to 
previous negative comments about the Big 
Six power companies. It was argued that the 
public would need to know the criteria by 
which they would operate: 
‘...it needs to be embedded in law so that [the 
local area] can’t suddenly be switched off with 
power simply just so [neighbouring town] 
can have a bit more [...] who is going to be in 
control?
(R4, Rural B)   
The Smart 2050 scenario was viewed as much 
farther in the future than the other scenarios, 
and as ‘too much’, ‘too controlling’ and 
‘confusing’. Automation of appliances was met 
with resistance as it was associated with a 
lack of control and an invasion of privacy:
‘I don’t want no company saying like ‘well right 
about now your machine’s not going to work 
because it’s high peak [...] it’s like it becomes to 
know your habits, it knows how you operate, 
that’s kind of scary’
(R1, Urban A)
There was particular concern around fridges 
being automated, a fault occurring and 
food being spoiled. As systems increased 
in complexity, the chance of things going 
wrong increased too for participants. External 
controls would have to take into account 
people’s varying needs (e.g. those with health 
problems). An override function would be 
essential, allowing consumers to take control 
if needed.
Real-time tariffs were seen as too complicated, 
with participants already confused about the 
current energy market and the multitude 
of tariffs on offer. Yet, some mentioned 
Economy-7 systems as simple, practical 
and something everyone could understand. 
Experience with energy tariffs was in direct 
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contrast to people’s experiences with 
mobile phone pricing which was more 
straightforward. Underlying all this was a 
lack of trust for institutions – insurance 
companies, banks, politicians – as well as the 
Big Six power companies.
This scenario also includes community energy 
schemes. The idea of communities producing 
their own energy was well received, seen as a 
way of regaining control and making money 
by selling excess energy back to National Grid. 
One rural group speculated over how urban 
areas would fare as it was assumed they 
might not be socially cohesive enough for the 
scheme to work. The rural engaged group, 
who had extensive experience of generating 
their own energy, had already had problems 
with the distribution of profits. Nevertheless, 
the idea of becoming more self-sufficient 
was appealing and represented a more old 
fashioned, sustainable way of life.
On the post-workshop questionnaire, 
participants indicated their preferred scenario. 
As shown in Figure 12, around half (53%) 
preferred the Groundswell scenario; the 
next most popular scenario was the Smart 
2050 scenario, which was selected by 28% of 
participants. The reasons for choices made 
were also elicited (see Figure 13) participants 
could select reasons from a broader range 
provided). The most popular reasons were 
environmental and financial, particularly 
allowing for more renewable energy sources 
and reducing energy bills. Reasons relating to 
system operation, supply security and market 
structure were less popular. Rural respondents 
(61.1%) were particularly likely to select 
increased renewable supply as the reason for 
their scenario choice, compared to than urban 
respondents (38.9%). Those with smart grid-
related experience (56.7%) were more likely 
to select ‘being able to reduce your energy 
use’ than were those without experience 
(43.3%), and to select ‘many (new) companies 
providing smart home services’ as a reason 
(72.7% vs. 27.3%).
Respondents were also asked about barriers 
that might stop your favourite scenario from 
becoming reality (again participants were 
able to select reasons from a broader range 
provided).
Figure 14 shows that the three barriers cited 
most frequently were: insufficient data 
protection measures, consumer unwillingness 
to share data, and insufficient financial 
savings for consumers.
Further observations
 
The last part of discussions aimed to reveal 
public views on key trade-offs that are likely 
to shape the functions and capabilities 
enabled by smart grids (Box 6). The first 
such trade-off addressed the sharing of 
individuals’ energy use data in comparison 
with potential cost savings (i.e. the desire to 
protect privacy vs. the desire to reduce bills). 
The second examined the importance of 
renewable energy as opposed to the any-time 
availability of electricity at the same price. 
Regarding the first, participants wanted to 
see a more dynamic relationship where, if 
consumers shared information, they would be 
kept informed as to how it was used and what 
effective change it resulted in, as well as any 
gains or limitations observed over time. Some 
others argued that receiving financial benefits 
(i.e. reduced bills) in return would be a factor 
in their decision.
Figure 12. Public workshop participants’ 
preferred scenario
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‘I think I would probably sit somewhere in 
the middle actually, I think I’d be reasonably 
comfortable with some information being made 
available and the trade-off being that I would 
get some kind of reduced cost’
(R1, Rural Eng B)
For some others, the decisive factor was 
whether they would receive clear benefit in 
return for sharing their data (via a ‘derived’ 
service [22], for example being able to monitor 
elderly relatives’ wellbeing), building on 
‘motivated cognition’ theory [23].
In the case of the second trade-off, it is 
interesting to note that for some participants 
having lots of renewable electricity in the 
system was regarded as a desirable ‘end goal’ 
and that they had very little understanding of 
the implications of this at a system level.
Whilst many participants recognised 
the environmental benefits of renewable 
electricity, they did not want to be restricted in 
their energy use, as their daily routine may be 
unpredictable.
Participants also discussed the reliability of 
advanced communication systems, especially 
in the context of physical geography. Based 
on past experiences, there were comments 
on how physical geography might limit the 
capacity of transmitters and what would it 
mean for the reliability of energy supplies. In 
addition, over-reliance on electricity was also 
raised, with concerns emerging over whether 
this would reduce security of supply.
A final observation relates to trust and 
perception of power companies. Mistrust 
towards power companies was more common 
in non-engaged communities than in engaged 
ones. Participants in one group, engaged in 
an active community scheme, explained how 
they have managed to keep their energy bills 
the same in recent years despite increases 
in the price of energy. Rather than appearing 
resentful, they discussed these issues much 
more neutrally, which may reflect a feeling of 
empowerment regarding their energy use.
Box 6. Exploration of trade-offs in the public workshops
Privacy vs. Cost Savings: To keep your bills down, the companies that operate the 
networks (NOT power companies – although they may need this information in 
future) would like to know more about the way you use energy. We do not have to 
share this information but if we do, it will help to keep our bills down.
Clean Electricity vs. Any-Time Use: As we have more wind turbines to generate clean 
electricity, we may have to fit some of our electricity use into the time when most 
wind is blowing. This may mean using things like washing machines, tumble dryers 
and dishwashers when our smart meters say it’s okay to run them.
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Figure 13. Reasons for preferred scenario (% of participants)
Figure 14. Perceived barriers to realising preferred scenario (% of participants)
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4.2 Spatial Implications
Our scenarios portray alternative pathways 
into future where new types of electricity 
demand (via electrification of heat and 
transport) and sources of supply (via 
distributed generation, including PV) are 
integrated into to the UK electricity networks. 
This presents multiple interdependencies: 
on the one hand policy incentives, market 
forces and consumer appetite are likely to 
determine where, at what speed and to what 
degree LCTs will be deployed. In turn, the net 
loads (i.e. the difference between consumption 
and generation sources) at the distribution 
networks will be different because it is 
unlikely that the same supply and demand 
sources will be deployed uniformly across the 
country. For example, whilst ground-source 
heat pumps may appear in rural areas off the 
gas grid, EVs may emerge in semi-urban areas, 
perhaps initially as a second car. Furthermore, 
a key issue in the early stages of deployment is 
local clustering of these technologies, as was 
evidenced by the growth of PV installations 
(Figure 15). 
These technologies have impacts, most 
significantly, in low voltage networks. If the 
load experienced on a network reaches its 
maximum rating, investment will be needed 
to release additional headroom. Smart 
solutions such as DSR can play a significant 
role in avoiding or deferring costly investment 
in upgrading substation capacity. In return for 
shifting the time they use some part of their 
electrical demand to another time consumers 
may have the opportunity to access lower 
energy tariffs. The corollary of this is that 
consumers who cannot shift their demand 
may pay higher tariffs for energy used in 
periods of high demand. Some consumers 
may be unwilling or unable to shift their 
consumption (an obvious example would be 
vulnerable consumers who require heating 
throughout the day) and thus may see price 
rises. Inability to shift energy demand might 
also be due to economic circumstances, for 
example not having the capital to access 
smart technologies. An emerging literature 
on social issues points to a further risk that 
the availability of smart grid technologies and 
services might be perceived exclusive 
Figure 15. Number of domestic PV 
installations per 10,000 households by 
local authorities, as at end of June 2013 
Source: Ofgem E-serve database (as of 30.06.2013)
Notes: 1) There are 14,496 domestic PV installations 
that have not been allocated to Local Authorities due to 
missing locational references. 2) For Scotland, areas are 
represented as Council Areas. 
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to homeowners only [24]. Indeed, an often-
overlooked issue is that whilst 30% of the UK 
population lives in rented properties, in some 
areas tenants constitute up to three quarters 
of the population (see Figure 16).
Some consumers whose consumption patterns 
already fit the low demand profile may benefit 
but this would not deliver significant system 
benefits. The key uncertainty here regarding 
effectiveness is whether the different possible 
tariffs that might come to market can 
engender behaviour change, but there is also 
an issue as to the social impacts that might 
arise; will the adoption of new tariffs lead 
to more or less fuel poverty and associated 
impacts such as health? [25].
In addition to interactions between individual 
households and their ability to take up of 
the opportunities presented by DSR, other 
infrastructural, geographical, network 
and socio-structural characteristics might 
affect the spatial distribution of smart grid 
functions. Experts articulated that some 
smart energy system functions like DSR 
technologies, active load management and 
controllability are more likely to be in urban 
than rural areas. However, given a significant 
variation in energy use between urban and 
rural areas (Figure 17), including fuel source 
(or access to the gas grid), socio-economic 
variation and characteristics of the built 
environment, it is not known whether such 
factors can help or hinder the adoption of 
LCTs as well as how these technologies might 
affect these differences in the future. However, 
a guaranteed outcome is that deployment of 
LCTs will be layered on top of these disparities, 
resulting in a more spatially differentiated and 
diversified electricity system.
The literature on how urban and rural energy 
systems might be reshaped and reconstituted 
as a result of these changes in future is in 
its infancy and we have not had scope to 
explore these issues in detail. Key research 
questions include: at what level of variable 
generation does DSR become essential and 
would this vary depending on location (and if 
so, how)? What types of households are most 
responsive to DSR signals? How does the value 
of DSR change when it is used to address local 
congestion vs. national balancing? 
Figure 16. Distribution of population living 
in rented housing (2011) (%)
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) and National 
Records of Scotland (NRS)
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What are the implications of controlling 
energy demand as well as supply and storage 
at a local level? What impacts might different 
EV battery-charging arrangements have upon 
electricity networks at both local and national 
levels?
There is limited research on the impact 
of LCTs on load growth and associated 
investment needs in the distribution networks 
[9], and so further research is needed. EA 
Technology (2012) assesses the impact of LCT 
uptake for prototype networks at extra high 
voltage, high voltage and low voltage levels for 
urban, suburban and rural areas. Whilst there 
is limited scope to anticipate how consumers 
will actually respond to these technologies 
and services (due to the ‘action-value gap’), 
further research is needed to identify the 
nature and scope of this uncertainty, as well 
as how to utilise these differences to deliver 
effective, efficient and equitable outcomes 
rather than deepening existing inequalities.
Figure 17. Residential energy use per 10,000 
households by local authorities by different 
geographies (2011, GWh) (%)
Source: Urban vs rural split is based on Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) and National Records of 
Scotland (NRS), Energy Data is based on [26]
Notes: For Scotland, areas are represented as 
Council Areas.
Discussion and 
Conclusions
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The research reveals a high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the future of smart 
grids in the UK. This applies not only to the 
general public, but also to those working in 
and with the industry, for whom stronger 
vision and leadership in the long-term 
would reduce risk, uncertainty and expense 
substantially. Some of this uncertainty might 
reasonably be expected to be mitigated by 
coordinated government action but some 
will require sectoral stakeholders to respond 
with new approaches to risk management 
and adopt new business models to address 
the ‘broken value chain’ problem. The need 
for government transparency and long-term 
predictability applies equally to drivers for a 
smart grid: solid commitment to renewable 
energy targets to 2030 and beyond, for 
example, is essential if the infrastructure of 
the future is to accommodate much more 
unpredictable and more decentralised power 
flows and the technologies needed to manage 
them.
The following section summarises key issues 
that will affect the direction and pace of 
smart grid development in the UK. Section 2 
relates previous UK smart grid scenarios to 
ours. Section 3 focuses on the implications of 
our scenarios by identifying key messages for 
decision makers across government, industry 
and business.
5.1 Characterising 
determinants of smart grid 
development in the UK
Building on extensive stakeholder engagement 
via expert interviews, online surveys, expert 
workshop and public deliberative workshops, 
this project portrays alternative scenarios for 
the development of smart grids in the UK. 
Below we highlight a number of key issues 
that will determine which of these pathways 
might be realised in the coming decades in 
smartening the UK’s electricity grid:
The benefits and pitfalls of smart grids. Although 
our surveys show that experts agreed on the 
need to make electrical delivery smarter, and 
that smart grids can afford various benefits – 
particularly cost savings, network balancing, 
facilitating renewables and emissions 
reduction – many also see smart grid solutions 
as unproven, underdeveloped, complex and 
difficult to implement. Consumer engagement 
and demand management were identified as 
benefits, but consumer resistance was also 
considered a risk. Data protection and privacy 
were identified as problematic, demanding 
greater transparency and data protection 
safeguards to gain customer trust.
Uncertainty. The development of smart grids 
involves many different elements within the 
electricity supply industry and the wider 
world. Action to reduce uncertainty would 
enhance the ability of all stakeholders to 
plan more effectively. We found that many 
stakeholders felt uncertainty over how 
the expected expansion of new energy 
technologies might shape networks, and 
that this makes it difficult for them to make 
definitive assessments, even over the next 
decade (relating directly to the 2015-2023 
operating period of RIIO-ED1). No stakeholders 
felt able to evaluate future network needs or 
their evolution beyond 2025.
This throws up the question of how regulation 
would need to evolve alongside developing 
technology and market services. Experience 
suggests that it would have to take into 
account changing circumstances on an 
ongoing basis. Reducing uncertainty is not 
a straightforward matter. A national smart 
grid coordinator might have responsibility for 
identifying and shaping policy to mitigate risk. 
To be effective this would have to be able to 
influence policy at both Ofgem and DECC.
Risk Management. Since privatisation DNOs 
have existed in a regulatory framework that 
has rewarded gradual increases in efficiency 
with little incentive for innovation since it 
was seen as largely unnecessary. System-wide 
adoption of low carbon technologies is likely 
to change the demands on the networks and 
regulation has begun to change to reflect 
that. DNO behaviour will have to change with 
it, to invest in new technologies, strengthen 
their skills base, and make decisions based 
on developing networks which may need to 
handle integrated generation and increased 
and more volatile consumer demand – with 
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limited information on when and by how 
much this might happen.
Coordination. As was also raised by the IET [28], 
overall coordination of activities is central 
to making sure smart grids happen and to 
ensuring potential conflict arising across the 
disparate elements of the electricity supply 
industry do not provide additional barriers 
to uptake. Concerns have been raised about 
a lack of vision in planning for smart grid 
development beyond 2020, with DECC singled 
out in particular as needing to provide more of 
a coherent lead.
Long-term policy. Predictable and sustained 
policy support is widely held to be essential 
for the deployment of LCTs, and it is likely 
that similar support for smart grids would 
create clearer investment conditions for the 
developers of the relevant technologies. Long-
term policy commitment across the wider 
policy environment relevant to smart grids 
would be likely to contribute significantly 
to enhanced investor confidence. This is in 
relation to both the smart grid drivers (such 
as growth in renewables) as well as regulation 
to drive innovation and investment amongst 
network operators.
Organisational frameworks. The systematic 
rolling out of learning from Low Carbon 
Networks Fund projects (along with others) 
and their commercialisation will require 
proper incentivisation and the right 
investment conditions. Experts expressed 
concern around the capacity of DNOs both to 
invest in research initiatives and to roll out 
any innovative output from these programmes 
on a systematic basis. Since this is primarily 
an investment issue it may be necessary for 
DNOs to look for ways to do this and, at the 
same time, for Ofgem to give appropriate 
incentives which take into account any 
associated risk and benefits. Here as in other 
areas, the scope may be limited by what 
Ofgem will allow as much as the appetite of 
the DNOs to find new ways of doing things.
Markets. Finding ways of enabling new 
entrants and new services is essential. 
A market framework which allows new 
providers to offer new services more easily 
is likely to stimulate the kinds of innovation 
required for greater systemic smartness. This 
might include new supply companies, energy 
service companies, aggregators and DSOs 
depending on the evolution of the system and 
how investors respond. The current market 
is dominated by the Big Six, which has led 
to problems including market illiquidity and 
other disincentives to new entrants to the 
sector. Additional barriers to market entry by 
new small companies may include economies 
of scale, network charges, low sectoral 
margins and the complexity of regulation. 
The UK’s ongoing Electricity Market Reform 
expresses concern and a desire for action to 
address this but questions have been raised 
around whether EMR as currently proposed 
will be successful. 
Public acceptability. The public is ambivalent 
about smart grids, perceiving them to 
afford both benefits and risks. The most 
popular scenario was Groundswell, followed 
by the Smart 2050 scenario, with reasons 
relating to the environmental and financial 
benefits (e.g. more renewables, lower bills). 
Participants were able to envisage modifying 
their behaviour in order to use electricity 
from renewable sources, but with the proviso 
that they could override the system when 
necessary. However, in contrast there was a 
common view that the decision should be 
taken out of consumers’ hands as part of a 
government-led green strategy.
Consumer data access. Smart meters will 
generate large volumes of data. The usefulness 
of this data in allowing better network 
management will depend on who has access 
to it, how long access is able to continue 
after the data is generated and whether it is 
geographically specific. At the same time there 
are significant concerns over the protection 
of data, its security and over consumer rights 
to privacy, confirming findings in the wider 
literature. Current negative perceptions of the 
Big Six power companies greatly influenced 
participants’ attitudes towards data sharing 
(and to personal energy-related behavioural 
change). On the other hand, a Eurobarometer 
survey from 2011 indicates that two thirds 
of the UK population is unaware of the 
existence of a national public authority 
responsible for protecting their personal data 
rights [29]. Hence, there is a risk of both the 
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exploitation of uninformed consumers who 
unintentionally give away more information 
than they are aware of, and for the imposition 
of unnecessary limits on accessing data from 
willing consumers. Again, communicating the 
benefits of data access to the public, ideally 
via a source perceived as neutral, is likely to 
have substantial long-term system benefits, 
particularly if this process is transparent.
Consumer buy-in. Securing public commitment, 
although challenging, is perceived by virtually 
all stakeholders as essential to opening 
up network services able to respond to a 
future system with substantial intermittent 
generation and increasingly volatile load. 
Rather than just ‘flicking a switch’ it is 
expected that the public will be able to 
choose from more differentiated and dynamic 
tariffs, become accustomed to operating 
new technologies and shifting their energy 
use. Whilst incentives may play a role, the 
communication of why these changes are 
needed and the role of power companies 
in this transition is equally important. Our 
research suggests that early communication 
of the benefits of smart grid capabilities, 
the establishment of effective delivery 
mechanisms (especially for the demand 
response market) and finding ways of ensuring 
that benefits flow to consumers are all likely 
to play a part in encouraging household 
participation.
Energy citizenship. Community energy may 
help to foster energy citizenship. Our public 
workshops revealed more positive attitudes 
towards functions and services offered by 
smart grids in communities with active energy 
schemes. These can play an important part 
in communicating smart grids benefits as 
well as addressing issues around mistrust 
towards power companies and government by 
fostering energy citizenship and empowering 
local communities.
Value proposition for consumers. Synergies 
with other smart systems may help to build 
a stronger case for smart grids in the eyes 
of consumers. For the majority of the UK 
population ‘disclosing personal information 
is an increasing part of modern life’; 65% 
of UK citizens are aware of the need to 
disclose personal information so they can 
access new products or services [29]. Our 
workshop findings also support the view 
that if householders’ data is used to deliver 
a service that contributes to their quality of 
life (e.g. being able to monitor their elderly 
relatives), they are more likely to share it. The 
development of joined-up thinking across 
policy areas as well as integrated services 
across energy, transport and healthcare 
domains, could not only generate cross-
cutting efficiencies but might help alleviate 
consumer concerns on data privacy. An 
implication might be that this approach could 
be applied across different scales, from smart 
homes to smart communities and cities.
Distribution of costs and benefits. Moving from 
a system where the cost of delivering each 
additional unit of electricity is averaged 
across all consumers to one that reflects 
actual costs could have important social 
implications. It has been observed that this 
might lead to different electricity prices even 
on neighbouring streets, depending on the 
constraints on the grid at a given time [30]. It 
is vital that the costs are not perceived by the 
public to be unevenly spread, and the same 
applies to the benefits: many members of the 
public we spoke to felt that future changes 
would be designed simply to maximise 
power company profits. There are of course 
competing notions of what constitutes an 
appropriate distribution of costs, and adding 
these costs to bills may well be at odds with 
the objectives of fuel poverty campaigners. 
However, a perception that the costs of 
developing a smart grid are being borne 
inequitably would undoubtedly hinder the 
process.
Spatial differences. Experts articulated that 
smart energy system functions like DSR 
technologies, active load management and 
controllability would be more likely to be 
implemented in urban than non-urban 
areas, compounding current physical, socio-
structural and infrastructural differences. 
There is a need for a better understanding 
of the two-way relationship between these 
inequalities and the uptake of various smart 
technologies and services. In order to avoid the 
widening of these differences, more research is 
needed to address how smart energy delivery 
would shape these differences and vice versa. 
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More research is needed so as to understand 
fully where and how the distributional 
impacts of smarter energy delivery are 
likely to fall, and how policy intervention 
could be used to avoid exacerbating existing 
inequalities.
5.2 Relevance to other UK 
smart grid scenarios
Building on the Carbon Plan’s [6] examination 
of the uptake of LCTs at a national level, the 
Smart Grid Forum developed scenarios [9] 
on smart grid development in the UK, along 
with an associated modelling tool to assist 
DNOs in the preparation of their business 
plans for RIIO-ED1. Based on 2012 data, each 
of these scenarios assumes different levels 
of LCT uptake and DSR. Generation profiles 
follow the National Grid scenarios [6] where 
Scenarios 0, 1 and 2 are aligned with the ‘Gone 
Green’ scenario whilst Scenario 3 adheres to 
less ambitious decarbonisation of supply as 
portrayed in ‘Slow Progression’.
Scenario 3 is most consistent with the 
Minimum Smart scenario in this report, where 
existing inertia in the system and a lack of 
strong policy incentives for decarbonisation, 
coupled with less interest from public, results 
in renewable energy and climate targets 
being missed and the need to purchase 
international carbon credits (see Table 3 on 
page 60). Scenario 0 draws the upper boundary 
as portrayed in our Smart 2050 scenario. 
Scenarios 1 and 2 have the same level of 
LCT uptake but different levels of customer 
engagement with DSR (lower in the latter). 
This therefore places them in the same areas 
as the Groundswell and Smart Power Sector 
scenarios respectively.
Our work builds on these ENA scenarios, but 
there is scope to explore the quantitative 
aspects in more detail. By drawing on existing 
literature and expert knowledge, consistent 
with overall framework of these scenarios, our 
scenarios indicate how interactions across 
policy, regulatory, commercial, financial, 
behavioural, organisational and technical 
factors might lead to one scenario versus 
another one. It is expected that the socio-
technical framework we have adopted in our 
scenarios will help with the understanding 
of implications of key decisions for the 
decision-makers (whether in policy, industry 
or business) to avoid any unintended 
consequences, given the significant costs and 
benefits of smart grid technologies and the 
challenges ahead.
5.3 Key messages
This section contains a small number of 
key messages that have emerged from 
this research and the construction of the 
accompanying scenarios. These messages 
could either form the foundations of 
future research, or be addressed by various 
stakeholder groups or policymakers. Smart 
grids in the UK are currently at such an early 
stage in their evolution that a wide range 
of developmental pathways is available. 
A corollary of this uncertainty, however, is 
the opportunity that exists for shaping the 
direction the industry takes.
The need to develop a set of indicators in order 
to measure progress. The range of scenarios 
described in this report demonstrates that 
diverse outcomes are credible. These would be 
expected to have very different consequences 
for the achievement of government policy 
goals with regard to decarbonisation, security 
of supply and affordability. Furthermore, 
examining the ‘wildcard’ impacts reveals 
that there could be critical ‘branching points’ 
on the scenario pathways that may result in 
what was previously a satisfactory pathway 
flipping to an unsatisfactory one. The multi-
faceted interdependencies between supply 
chains, consumer engagement, time lags 
between investment decisions and build-up 
of infrastructure etc. raises the need to have 
a sufficient vision to know whether we are 
following a pathway consistent with our goals.
Ensuring equitable outcomes. Smarter energy 
delivery promises to enable more efficient 
use of energy infrastructure through the 
introduction of differentiated tariffs and 
demand side response programmes. However, 
our research reveals that the distribution of 
benefits is unlikely to be uniform within and 
across different geographical settings. 
68
Due to differences in lifestyles, socio-
economic characteristics, education levels 
and normative constraints, consumers’ ability 
and willingness to accept smart technology 
and services might vary within the same 
geographical settings. On the other hand, 
different smart grid functions and capabilities 
(albeit at different costs) might be enabled in 
different geographical settings as a result of 
physical, socio-structural and infrastructural 
differences. The development of business 
models, policy tools and measures to manage 
these differences, rather than widen them, 
is an important area for further research, as 
public perceptions here can act as a strong 
driver or barrier (see below).
Public engagement. Public workshop 
participants perceived more of the benefits 
from smart grids accruing to private 
companies, with more risks and/or costs 
accruing to consumers and society – that 
is, power companies, not ‘ordinary people’, 
will be the ones to benefit from smart 
technologies. Although we found that the 
public does generally see the lifestyle benefits 
of smart technologies, it is critical to build 
trust and repair the widespread negative 
perception of the industry so that lacklustre 
public opinion – or even outright opposition 
– does not impede smart grid progress. Our 
results also highlight the importance of 
community energy schemes for engaging 
the public with a smart grid transition: first, 
communities with an active energy scheme 
expressed less resentment towards power 
companies; secondly the scenario which had 
the most public support was Groundswell 
where strong community engagement is 
the key characteristic. This highlights the 
importance of building public trust in a way 
in which consumers do not feel they bear the 
risks and/or costs whilst not receiving the 
benefits.
Joined-up thinking across smart systems to 
generate consumer buy-in. The utilisation of 
opportunities and benefits offered via ‘smart 
energy’ delivery requires a shift from the 
traditional ‘supply and predict’ paradigm for 
both consumers and energy providers. Both 
our research and the emerging literature 
indicate that in order for consumers to 
share their data, there needs to be clear and 
demonstrable benefits of doing so. Whilst 
lower bills may motivate some, others would 
like to see how doing so contributes to their 
daily lives beyond limited financial savings 
(e.g. being able to monitor elderly parent’s 
health from smart metering data). Hence, a 
way to initiate consumer buy-in and interest 
could be via offering integrated services within 
energy, transport or healthcare domains. 
Such an approach would require new working 
relationships and business models across the 
energy industry, business, information and 
communications technology (ICT) companies 
and other new entrants. Expert interviews 
revealed that the current advisory body, the 
Smart Grid Forum, is a good starting point, 
but that more needs to be done; for example, 
the development of a regulatory architecture 
that removes and addresses systemic barriers, 
and the addition of consumer representation 
in the Forum itself. Further research could 
be carried out to further the understanding 
of how smart grids can form the foundations 
of wider smart systems, such as smart 
communities and cities.
Risk, Innovation and Investment. Network 
operators are historically risk-averse, aiming 
to provide a highly reliable service with 
little scope or incentive for innovation. 
The emerging challenges to the electricity 
system will require different behaviour, 
with innovation coming to the fore to allow 
minimisation of costs. This implies greater 
risk and network operators will need to be 
sufficiently incentivised to take risks and 
innovate, in so doing generating learning 
effects. This in turn should reduce associated 
investment risks, which will need to be 
mitigated as far as possible to keep overall 
costs down. Risk aversion was seen as the 
single most important barrier to smart 
technology investments. Uncertainty over 
return on investment, particularly when 
caused by ambiguous government signals and 
regulatory instability, heightens investment 
risk and pushes up the cost of large 
infrastructure projects. A risk management 
approach therefore needs to be adopted 
across the whole range of actors, including 
government. Changes in culture are not 
limited to the network operators.
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The potential for limitations from regulation 
was also noted; the regulator will need to be 
open to and willing to allow network operators 
to run greater risks.
Identifying no-regrets technology solutions could 
help to mitigate uncertainty. The possibility 
of very diverse futures raises the question 
of whether or not there could be some no-
regrets technology solutions that can help to 
manage less-ideal situations. The Smart Power 
Sector scenario shows that balancing the grid 
may become more difficult in the absence of 
widespread demand side response. Bearing 
in mind the long lead times of infrastructure 
investments in the power sector, technologies 
like distributed storage or smart charging 
could be used as a part of a mitigation 
strategy. Further work needs to be undertaken 
in this area to identify such technology 
solutions and develop ways to support their 
commercialisation.
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